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The National Flood Insurance Program at Fifty:
How the Fifth Amendment Takings Doctrine Skews
Federal Flood Policy
CHRISTINE A. KLEIN*
ABSTRACT
The National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) of 1968 marked its fiftieth
anniversary in 2018. Despite the program’s long history, few appreciate that
the NFIP was never intended as a permanent federal subsidy for flood-prone
properties along rivers and coastlines abandoned as commercially unviable by
the private insurance industry. Instead, Congress provided flood insurance at
below-cost rates as only an interim solution until state and local governments
enacted permanent self-help land-use regulations that would restrict development in risky areas. By encouraging local governments to enact floodplain regulations, Congress intended to shift the costs of development in known flood
areas back to those who chose to occupy them, thereby sending a strong signal
of danger. But despite its lofty goals, the NFIP has failed miserably: It was
more than twenty billion dollars in debt to the U.S. treasury as it turned fifty. At
the same time, the nation continues to build in floodplains and to suffer death
and devastating property loss from recurrent floods.
What can account for the NFIP’s failings? Although there is extensive literature on the design flaws endemic to the NFIP itself, scant attention has been
directed to a pair of external contributors to the program’s ineffectiveness: the
regulatory and physical takings doctrines. This Article unpacks the role played
by those doctrines in undermining federal flood policy. The modern takings
movement was gaining momentum at roughly the same time as the NFIP’s passage, and several of the movement’s often-cited foundational cases took aim at
coastal and floodplain development regulations. The conventional justification
for the takings doctrine is that it prevents the public from foisting the cost of
regulation and government action onto individual property owners. But in the
case of coastal and floodplain development, the opposite is often true: The
actual or threatened filing of a takings lawsuit can have a costly and chilling
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impact on regulations, including those encouraged by the NFIP to promote
floodplain and coastal safety. As a result, the doctrine has helped to shift the financial costs of risky development to the general public and to make floodplain
occupants less safe.
Congress has been well aware of the NFIP’s failings for years and has struggled to come up with a solution that is both politically feasible and financially
sustainable. But surprisingly, the national dialogue has ignored the other half
of the puzzle—the judicially-created takings doctrine. This Article argues that
any durable solution must look at the entire problem and harness the power of
both Congress and the courts to send the signal that floodplains are not safe
and to create robust incentives for people to stay out of harm’s way.
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INTRODUCTION
The National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) of 1968 marked its fiftieth anniversary in 2018.1 Despite the program’s long history, few appreciate that the
NFIP was never intended as a permanent federal subsidy for flood-prone properties along rivers and coastlines abandoned as commercially unviable by the private insurance industry. Instead, Congress provided below-cost flood insurance
as only an interim solution until state and local governments enacted self-help
land-use regulations that would restrict development in risky areas.2 Congress
intended to shift the costs of development in known flood areas back to those who
chose to occupy them, thereby sending a strong signal of danger and discouraging
people from settling in hazard-prone areas. Further, Congress intended to relieve
the federal government of costly expenditures on flood prevention structures,
such as levees, dams, and reservoirs, and to reduce federal disaster relief payments when flooding inevitably occurred.3 Overall, Congress designed the NFIP
to make people safer and to reduce the federal government’s financial liabilities
for flood damage and flood control.
Despite its lofty goals, the NFIP has failed miserably: It was more than twenty
billion dollars in debt to the federal treasury as it turned fifty.4 At the same time,
the nation continues to build in floodplains and to suffer death and devastating
property loss from recurrent floods.5 What can account for the NFIP’s failings?
Although there is extensive literature on the design flaws endemic to the NFIP

1. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–448, 82 Stat. 572, 572 (1968) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq.).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra text accompanying note 49.
4. See National Flood Insurance Program, U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, https://www.gao.
gov/key_issues/disaster_assistance/national-flood-insurance-program (last visited July 27, 2018)
(placing FEMA’s debt at $20.5 billion as of February 2018). This figure represents the debt in February
2018, after the Treasury Department forgave an additional sixteen billion dollars incurred after
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. Id.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 111–14.
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itself, scant attention has been directed to a pair of external contributors to the
program’s ineffectiveness: the regulatory and physical takings doctrines.
The modern takings movement was gaining momentum at roughly the same
time as the NFIP’s passage, and several of the movement’s often-cited foundational cases took aim at regulations directed at coastal and floodplain areas.6 The
conventional justification for the takings doctrine is that it prevents the public
from foisting the cost of regulation and government action onto individual property owners. As the U.S. Supreme Court articulated in 1960 in Armstrong v.
United States, “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”7 In the case of
coastal and floodplain development, however, the opposite is often true: Takings
litigation can have a costly impact on land-use regulators, including those encouraged by the NFIP to promote floodplain and coastal safety. Even if unsuccessful,
the prosecution of a lawsuit can impose substantial litigation costs, often beyond
the reach of many small communities. Furthermore, the mere threat of a takings
lawsuit can have a deterrent effect on would-be regulators. As a result, the doctrine has helped to shift the financial costs of risky development—costs that arguably should be borne by the developers and property owners who undertake such
risks—to the general public. To be sure, there are many reasons why communities allow development in risky, flood-prone areas: to maintain a strong tax base,
to support the local economy, or a laissez-faire opposition to government regulation. Nevertheless, the takings doctrine provides an important and under-explored
rationale for the ineffectiveness of the floodplain regulation upon which the NFIP
relies.
Part I examines the evolution of the NFIP, an early example of what has come
to be known as “cooperative federalism.” This Part explains that the NFIP represents the federal government’s third attempt to manage floods and flood damage,
after federally-engineered flood control structures and federal disaster relief alone
proved expensive and inadequate. Through the NFIP, the federal government
offered to provide temporary, below-cost flood insurance, but only if its state and
local partners adopted permanent land-use regulations designed to constrict development away from known flood zones and to guide it to safer ground.
Part II considers the political economy of coastal and floodplain development,
suggesting who stands to benefit from such development. Using the example of
the devastating floods in Houston and surrounding Harris County when
Hurricane Harvey struck in 2017, the discussion examines how floodplain development can produce both “winners” and “losers.” This Part concludes that flood
policy can be distorted by well-organized groups pursuing their own self-interest
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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through litigation and the political process. Such efforts can displace congressional incentives and logical, hydrology-based planning.
Part III explores the regulatory and physical takings doctrines. This Part takes
a granular look at the threat of takings liability to government regulators and
actors, suggesting that it has been both over- and under-estimated. Under the regulatory takings doctrine, the success rate of property owners has been remarkably
low. This suggests local regulators’ fear of takings liability may be overblown,
needlessly deterring them from enacting otherwise desirable land-use regulation.
Conversely, property owners have enjoyed a reasonably high rate of success
under the physical takings doctrine, claiming government flood-control structures
released floodwaters onto their property that resulted in temporary or permanent
flooding. This higher rate of success may result, in part, from current doctrinal
confusion as to whether the appropriate action by flooded landowners against
government actors sound in tort or in takings.
Based on these observations, Part IV suggests a way forward. It recommends
encouraging property owners and developers to internalize the costs of risky
land-use decisions and to stay out of harm’s way, rather than externalizing the
costs onto federal taxpayers. This Part considers reforms to both the NFIP and the
takings doctrine that can simultaneously protect human life and property, as well
as the taxpayer’s purse.
I. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: FLOOD FEDERALISM
The Congress finds that . . . flood disasters have . . . placed an increasing burden on the Nation’s resources . . . . It is therefore the purpose of this title to
authorize a flood insurance program . . . [based on workable methods of] distributing burdens equitably among those who will be protected by flood insurance and the general public.8

More than fifty years ago, Congress established the National Flood Insurance
Program (“NFIP”) when it passed the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.9
Given the federal government’s half-century-long practice of subsidizing many
flood insurance policies at below-cost rates, it would be easy to assume Congress
designed the NFIP as a permanent subsidy. Nothing could be further from the
truth. As this Part reveals, that assumption turns the original legislative design on
its head.
Congress was motivated by an urgent desire to blunt the deadly and costly
impact of floods by moving development out of the path of floodwaters.10
Although a program of insurance alone could speed up recovery after disaster
strikes, it would do little to reduce flooding’s high cost in suffering and dollars.

8. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1302.
9. Id.
10. See infra Part I.B.

290

THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:285

Recognizing this, Congress had broader and more durable goals in mind.
Through the NFIP, Congress intended to fundamentally shift the costs of flood
damage to those who chose to settle in areas of predictable flooding.11 This downshifting would weaken the incentive to occupy risky areas. Further, the NFIP contained inducements for state and local governments to enact land-use regulations
restricting new floodplain development. Over time, Congress intended that these
measures would reduce exposure to flooding and relieve the federal government
of much of the financial responsibility it had undertaken to keep the nation safe
from floods and to compensate flood victims with disaster relief.12 The program
has now been in effect for more than fifty years. But, as this Part discusses, it has
fallen woefully short of achieving the goals originally articulated by Congress
in 1968.
A.

THE DESIGN: DOWNSHIFTING COSTS TO RISK TAKERS

Throughout the twentieth century, Congress experimented with a variety of
mechanisms to respond to the threat of flooding. Together, these efforts can be
described as a century of trial-and-error. This section discusses the three primary
flood responses undertaken by the federal government: engineered flood control
structures, disaster relief, and flood insurance. After assuming significant expense
for the cost of flood protection through the first two methods, the federal government eventually developed a system of federal flood insurance designed to shift a
significant portion of the cost and risk back down to floodplain occupants and
state and local governments.13
1. Phase One: Federal Levees and Other Structures
Originally, the nation perceived flood control as a matter of local concern
only.14 By the early nineteenth century, the federal government began to control,
divert, and dam rivers in the name of promoting navigation,15 but it was reluctant
to insert itself into the flood control business. Flood-related deaths and property
damage gradually increased interest in federal measures. After a 1913 flood in the
Ohio River Valley killed 415 people and caused approximately $200 million in
property damage, the call for federal intervention increased.16 The federal government cautiously entered the flood control arena, relying solely on the
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
14. See generally Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a
Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1478 (2007).
15. Id.; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 2 (1824) (interpreting the commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution as allowing the federal government to regulate navigation).
16. AM. INSTS. FOR RES., A CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS AFFECTING THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM 2 (2005), available from https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/
9612.
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construction of levees to prevent rivers from overflowing, and eschewing other
engineering measures such as reservoirs, which hold excess waters during times
of flood.17 It grounded its caution in the then-prevailing “levees only” engineering
philosophy; it posited that levees would constrict the flow of rivers during periods
of heavy precipitation and runoff, which would concentrate the rivers’ force
enough to scour and deepen their riverbeds, enabling rivers to accommodate
excess floodwaters.18
In time, the “levees only” theory proved to be a catastrophic failure.19 In particular, the Mississippi River Flood of 1927 demonstrated the theory’s gross inadequacy. Although the federal government through the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers had lined the lower Mississippi River with more than 1,600 miles of
levees up to eighteen feet wide,20 the 1927 flood caused up to 500 deaths, left
700,000 people homeless, destroyed property worth more than $236 million, and
inundated some thirteen million acres of land.21 Soon thereafter, through the
Flood Control Act of 1928, Congress rejected the “levees only” approach.22
Instead, Congress called for the construction of an expanded array of flood control works in the Mississippi River Basin, including outlets, floodways, spillways,
and diversion channels.23 Eight years later, through the Flood Control Act of
1936,24 Congress recognized floods as a “menace to national welfare” that cause
“loss of life and property” and explicitly assumed responsibility for flood control
nationwide.25
Although the 1928 and 1936 acts expanded the federal government’s flood
control responsibilities, they provided broad immunity for such endeavors,
17. Id. (discussing the 1861 report of Humphreys and Abbott); see also ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS &
HENRY L. ABBOTT, REPORT UPON THE PHYSICS AND HYDRAULICS OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER 30, 417–18
(1861), available from https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/AHE3908.0013.001?view=toc. Humphreys
and Abbott concluded that through their study “the great problem of protection against inundation was
solved” for the lower Mississippi River, and,
It has been demonstrated that no advantage can be derived either from diverting tributaries or constructing reservoirs, and that the plans of cut-offs, and of new or enlarged outlets to the gulf, are
too costly and too dangerous to be attempted. The plan of levees, on the contrary, which has always
recommended itself by its simplicity and its direct repayment of investments, may be relied upon
for protecting all of the alluvial bottom lands liable to inundation below Cape Girardeau.

HUMPHREYS & ABBOTT, supra note 17, at 30, 417–18 (emphasis in original).
18. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 14, at 1479.
19. Id. at 1483 (quoting Congressman Robert Crosser’s description of the levees only policy as a
“monumental blunder”).
20. CHRISTINE A. KLEIN & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MISSISSIPPI RIVER TRAGEDIES: A CENTURY OF
UNNATURAL DISASTER 61 (2014).
21. AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra note 16, at 3.
22. Flood Control Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-391, 45 Stat. 534, 535–36 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 701–09).
23. Id. at 535.
24. Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, 49 Stat. 1570, 1570 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C.A. § 701a).
25. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 14, at 1485 (citing 33 U.S.C.A. § 701a).
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asserting that “[n]o liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United
States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.”26 As the
Eighth Circuit explained, Congress recognized the high cost of federal flood
control works and “plainly manifested its will that those costs should not have
the flood damages that will inevitably recur added to them.”27 Further, the
court explained, in some cases, reliance on flood control works could “vastly
increas[e]” flood damages.28 The court concluded that flood damage immunity
undoubtedly “has been a factor of the greatest importance in the extent to
which Congress has been and is willing to make appropriations for flood control and to engage in costly undertakings to reduce flood damages.”29
But even the authorization of a nationwide network of federal flood control
structures fell short of insulating the country from the impact of devastating
floods. As the Association of State Floodplain Managers later explained, “the
mission-oriented flood control laws of the early 20th century were due, in part, to
the prevailing view that we could build our way out of almost any problem, with
engineers revered in American society then as only rock stars and sports heroes
are today.”30 For about the first three decades after the passage of the Flood
Control Act of 1936, the federal government spent more than twelve billion dollars on engineered flood control structures.31 Despite that expenditure, annual
flood losses continued to rise into the billions of dollars.32
Today, the nation’s rivers and coasts are covered with about 40,000 to 50,000
miles of levees and more than 78,000 dams.33 These flood control structures were
not designed to protect against all flooding (which would likely be impossible),
but only up to a specific level of flooding.34 Although these structures provide a
strong measure of protection, catastrophic damages continue to occur. As the
Association of State Floodplain Managers explains:
When structures fail or are overtopped with larger [precipitation] events, we
experience catastrophic flood damages for two reasons: one, more development occurs behind the levee because people and communities incorrectly
believe there is no longer a flood risk there; and two, new development has not
been elevated or otherwise protected, so levee failure may result in very deep

26. Flood Control Act of 1928, 45 Stat. at 536.
27. Nat’l Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 270 (8th Cir. 1954) (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 271.
30. JAMES M. WRIGHT, THE NATION’S RESPONSES TO FLOOD DISASTERS: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 12
(2000), available at https://www.floods.org/PDF/hist_fpm.pdf.
31. Id. at 31.
32. Id. (citing an estimated one billion dollars in annual flood losses in 1958 and two billion dollars in
1972, and explaining that, generally, “engineering had substantially reduced flood losses where they
were built, but people continued to move into unprotected areas”).
33. National Flood Programs & Policies in Review, ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS
(2015), available at http://www.floods.org/index.asp?menuid=%20828.
34. Id.
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flooding, causing total damage to the building and infrastructure instead of just
minor flooding.35

As the Association concludes, a portion of the flood damages that continue to
occur are compensated for by taxpayer-funded disaster relief, as explained in the
next section.
2. Phase Two: Federal Disaster Relief
Through passage of the Disaster Relief Act of 1950,36 Congress added a new
weapon to the federal government’s arsenal against flood damage: disaster relief
to alleviate the suffering that “inevitably”37 recurred despite the federal government’s best efforts to engineer its way out of flood damage. This law created for
the first time a permanent disaster relief system.38 The congressionally declared
intent to assist state and local governments in flood relief was restricted to a limited range of purposes: “to alleviate suffering and damage resulting from major
disasters, to repair essential public facilities in major disasters, and to foster the
development of such State and local organizations and plans to cope with major
disasters as may be necessary.”39 Notably, the legislation did not claim to help
people rebuild their property to full pre-disaster standards.
Congress intentionally limited disaster relief to protect the federal budget. Like
the immunity provisions of the Flood Control Acts of 1928 and 1936, disaster
relief legislation preserved the principle of federal non-liability. Congress firmly
declined to assume federal responsibility to indemnify flood victims for property
damage, but provided relief only for such Federal Emergency Management
Agency (“FEMA”) needs as shelter, clothing, and medical supplies.40 Legislators
vehemently rejected proposals during the 1950s to assume federal responsibility
for property loss indemnification because doing so could result in an “almost
unlimited number of claims from victims of every ‘Act of God’ disaster

35. Id.
36. An Act to Authorize Federal Assistance to States and Local Governments in Major Disasters, and
for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109, 1109 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
5121–23).
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38. AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra note 16, at 4.
39. An Act to Authorize Federal Assistance to States and Local Governments in Major Disasters, and
for Other Purposes § 1. In the wake of a presidentially-declared “major disaster” including floods,
droughts, fires, hurricanes, earthquakes, storms, or other catastrophes, Congress authorized the provision
of federal assistance “to supplement the efforts and available resources of state and local governments in
alleviating the disaster.” Id. § 2(a).
40. Nat’l Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 272–73 n.3 (1954) (explaining that the 1950 Act
“authorizes federal agencies to provide food, clothing, temporary shelter, and other critical needs to
victims of flood, hurricane, drought, earthquake, or other major disaster,” but “excludes federal
assumption of any responsibility of ‘payment for damages’ resulting from the disaster” and is obviously
“‘first-aid’ in nature” (citing 96 Cong. Rec. 11896–98, 11905)); see also id. at 272 n.3 (citing 96 Cong.
Rec. 11898, 11905; 97 Cong. Rec. 8177–78).
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throughout the country;” would have “enormous” financial implications; could
involve future sums of money that are “so staggering that the mortal mind cannot
comprehend it;” and could pose an existential threat to the federal government’s
very ability to “last.”41 Today, FEMA warns that disaster relief is meant to help
“with critical expenses that cannot be covered in other ways,” but is “not intended
to restore . . . damaged property to its condition before the disaster.”42
Federal disaster relief introduced the idea of hazard mitigation as a method of
reducing future flood losses and minimizing federal disaster payments—an idea
that would assume prominence later in the NFIP.43 The Disaster Relief Act, as
amended in 1974, required states and local communities receiving disaster assistance to engage in self-help hazard mitigation as a precondition for receiving federal assistance.44 Likewise, 1988 amendments known as the Stafford Act
continued to focus on hazard mitigation45 and authorized federal acquisition or
“buyouts” of properties damaged or destroyed by floods as an alternative to
rebuilding in flood-prone areas.46
Like federal flood control structures, federal disaster assistance proved to be an
imperfect response to floods and flood damage. This lesson was reinforced in
1965 after Hurricane Betsy, a Category Three hurricane, made landfall in Florida
and Louisiana, killing seventy-five people and submerging tens of thousands
of homes, some up to their rooftops.47 Hurricane Betsy was the nation’s first
“billion-dollar hurricane” in terms of flood damage (about $7.9 billion today,
adjusted for inflation)48 and the relief costs it imposed on the federal government

41. Id. (citing 82 Cong., 1st Sess., on Rehabilitation of Flood Stricken Areas, p. 87; H. Rept. 1092 on
H.J. Res. 341, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5; 97 Cong. Rec. 12637).
42. What is Disaster Assistance?, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/whatdisaster-assistance (last visited June 17, 2018).
43. See infra text accompanying note 51.
44. The Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143, 143 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5122). Among its purposes, the Act stated the congressional intent of
“encouraging hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from disasters, including development of land
use and construction regulations.” Id. Section 406 required states and communities receiving federal
disaster assistance to “agree that the natural hazards in the area in which the proceeds of the grants or
loans are to be used shall be evaluated and appropriate action shall be taken to mitigate such hazards,
including safe land-use and construction practices.” Id. § 406; see also AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra note
16, at 20 (describing the 1974 amendments as “the first congressional mandate for hazard mitigation as a
precondition for federal disaster assistance”).
45. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100707, § 404, 102 Stat. 4689 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. ch. 68, § 5121 et seq.) (authorizing the
President to contribute up to 50% of hazard mitigation costs determined to be “cost–effective and which
substantially reduce the risk of future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering”).
46. Id. § 5154a (1994) (failure to obtain and maintain flood insurance may preclude disaster
assistance).
47. KLEIN & ZELLMER, supra note 20, at 109.
48. See 1965: Hurricane Betsy Smashes Ashore Near New Orleans, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 8,
2011, 11:59 PM), https://www.nola.com/175years/index.ssf/2011/12/1965_hurricane_betsy_smashes_a.
html. According to one “inflation calculator,” one billion dollars in 1965 has equivalent purchasing
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were a major impetus for Congress to try yet a third approach to minimize flood
loss: federal insurance.49
3. Phase Three: The National Flood Insurance Program
Just three years after Hurricane Betsy struck, Congress passed the National
Flood Insurance Act of 1968.50 Through this legislation, Congress intended to
defray the expense of after-the-fact disaster relief by encouraging floodplain
occupants to pay insurance premiums into an insurance pool before disaster
struck. The House of Representatives’ report on the pending legislation explained
that disaster relief from the federal government and voluntary relief agencies had
proved inadequate, thereby “underlin[ing] the need for a program which will
make insurance against flood damage available, encourage persons to become
aware of the risk of occupying the flood plains, and reduce the mounting Federal
expenditures for disaster relief assistance.”51
The NFIP can be viewed as an early example of what has been called “cooperative federalism.” According to one definition, cooperative federalism “typically
appears as congressional or administrative efforts to induce (but not coerce or
commandeer) states to participate in a coordinated federal program.”52
Originating with the New Deal, cooperative federalism became what one commentator calls “an enduring, organizing concept in environmental law” during
the “explosion of [environmental] legislation in the 1970s. . .”53
Consistent with the cooperative federalism design, Congress carved out roles
for both federal and state/local governments with the goal of shifting the cost of
floodplain occupancy away from federal taxpayers and down to those who choose
to settle in flood-prone areas.54 For its part, the federal government would make
flood insurance available to the public—and, in many cases, at below-cost

power to $7.99 billion in 2018. Inflation Calculator, OFFICIAL DATA, https://www.officialdata.org/1965dollars-in-2018?amount=1 (last visited June 18, 2018).
49. 50th Anniversary of the National Flood Insurance Program, FEMA (Aug. 9, 2018, 11:37),
https://www.fema.gov/nfip50 (asserting that the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 “was motivated
by the devastating loss of life and property by Hurricane Betsy in 1965 and created the National Flood
Insurance Program”). Subsequently, a 1973 report by the Nixon Administration found that as a result of
the availability of federal disaster assistance, “individuals, businesses, and communities had little
incentives to take initiatives to reduce personal and local hazards.” AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra note 16,
at 19 (quoting House Document 93–100, 93rd Congress, First Session).
50. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 82 Stat. at 572.
51. H.R. Rep. No. 90-1585, at 2966–67 (1968).
52. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.
J. 179, 184 (2005).
53. Id. at 187.
54. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1302(d)(2) (expressing legislative purpose of
“distributing [flood insurance] burdens equitably among those who will be protected by flood insurance
and the general public”); see also Wright, supra note 30, at 34 (“The act was to return the cost for
location decisions back to the landowner and to account for the total cost in any decision regarding
occupancy or use of flood hazard areas, thereby shifting the burden from the taxpayer.”).
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subsidized rates.55 However, Congress required a quid pro quo from states and
local governments: Federal insurance would be available only to those communities that agreed to enact permanent zoning or land-use regulations to limit development in areas the federal government mapped as “special flood hazard areas”
at the level of the 1%-chance flood.56 These measures would encourage floodplain occupants to internalize the costs of risky development rather than to externalize them onto the federal government and taxpayers, “reducing the moral
hazard associated with full government support.”57
As a critical policy choice, the NFIP focuses on “special flood hazard areas,”
which are defined as places that have a one percent chance each year of flooding
(“1%-chance floodplains”). Although colloquially referred to as the “hundredyear floodplain,” these areas have a one percent chance of flooding each year,
making it possible to have “hundred year” floods in successive years.58
B.

THE MECHANISM: ENCOURAGING REGULATION OF RISKY LAND-USES

The National Flood Insurance Act occupied Title XIII of the sprawling
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.59 The latter addressed such
diverse topics as lower income housing, community development financing,
urban renewal, comprehensive urban planning, urban mass transportation, and
federal urban riot insurance.60 From among all the provisions of that act, only the
NFIP grew into a significant national program.61 One former NFIP official characterized the program as “an accident that occurred from political tradeoffs and
that survives by every flood disaster.”62
The idea of a national flood insurance program began to surface long before
the 1968 legislation. After the Mississippi River Flood of 1927, private insurers
started to pull out of the flood insurance market, concluding that it was not
55. See infra Part I.B.1; see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, AFFORDABILITY OF NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM PREMIUMS: REPORT 1, 26–28 (2015), available at https://www.nap.edu/read/
21709/chapter/4 (discussing subsidized rates for existing structures and actuarial risk-based rates for
new structures).
56. See infra Part I.B.2; see also National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1305(c)(2) (stating flood
insurance shall be available only in those areas that have “given satisfactory assurance that . . . permanent
land use and control measures will have been adopted . . . which are consistent with the comprehensive
criteria for land management and use developed under section 1361 . . . .”), 1307, 1308; NAT’L RES.
COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 26–29.
57. INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., SHARING THE CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN
MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY v (1994) (discussing measures that internalize risks, including
land use planning, elevating structures, and relocating buildings out of the floodplain).
58. Robert Holmes & Karen Dinicola, 100-Year Flood—It’s All About Chance, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY (Apr. 2010), https://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/106/pdf/100-year-flood-handout-042610.pdf. During the
life of a typical thirty-year mortgage for a property in a 1%-chance floodplain, a home would have a
26% chance of flooding at least once during the life of the mortgage. Id.
59. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–448, 82 Stat. 476, 572 (1968).
60. Id. at 526–27.
61. See Wright, supra note 30, at 33.
62. Id. (citing personal interview with Frank Thomas on October 13, 1999).
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commercially viable.63 By mid-century, some academics and others began to consider federal flood insurance to fill the void.64 In 1942, Gilbert F. White, who later
became known as the “father of flood plain management,”65 summed up then current federal policy in Human Adjustment to Floods, his doctoral dissertation for
the University of Chicago. He complained that federal flood policy at the time
was “in essence . . . one of protecting the occupants of flood plains against floods,
of aiding them when they suffer flood losses, and of encouraging more intensive
use of flood plains.”66 He acknowledged that the federal government had reduced
flood hazard for present floodplain occupants by “providing plans and all or at
least half of the cost of protective works,” yet, he worried such efforts would
“[stimulate] new occupants to venture into some flood plains that otherwise might
have remained unsettled or sparsely settled.”67 White estimated that floodplain
occupancy cost the federal government about ninety-five million dollars annually
at that time.68
In his dissertation, White recommended a system of federal flood insurance.69
Two decades later, he would chair a federal task force commissioned to examine
more closely the nation’s flood control policies.70 The task force’s 1966 report
encouraged the development of a unified federal program and provided a clear
caution, recognizing flood insurance as “a tool that should be used expertly or not
at all” because “[i]ncorrectly applied, it could exacerbate the whole problem of

63. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 23 (asserting “[f]lood insurance was offered by private
insurers between 1895 and 1927, but losses incurred from the 1927 Mississippi River floods and
additional flood losses in 1928 led insurers to stop offering flood policies”); AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra
note 16, at 3 (asserting that by 1929 the “private insurance industry abandons the coverage of flood
losses”), 6 (asserting that a 1956 American Insurance Association study “strengthen[ed] insurers’
conviction that flood insurance is not commercially [viable]”); see National Flood Insurance Act of 1968
§ 1302(b) (finding that “(1) many factors have made it uneconomic for the private insurance industry
alone to make flood insurance available to those in need of such protection on reasonable terms and
conditions; but (2) a program of flood insurance with large–scale participation of the Federal
Government and carried out to the maximum extent practicable by the private insurance industry is
feasible and can be initiated”).
64. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 3.
65. Patricia Sullivan, Gilbert F. White; Altered Flood-Plain Management, WASH. POST (Oct. 9,
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/08/AR2006100801035.html.
66. GILBERT F. WHITE, HUMAN ADJUSTMENT TO FLOODS 32–33 (1945), available at https://biotech.
law.lsu.edu/climate/docs/Human_Adj_Floods_White.pdf; see also Wright, supra note 30, at 16
(asserting it is “widely accepted that Gilbert F. White’s seminal study stimulated the interest and set the
course for the emergence and evolution, in ensuing decades, of broader approaches to flood problems”).
67. GILBERT F. WHITE, Dissertation on Human Adjustment to Floods (1945), reprinted in
GEOGRAPHY, RESOURCES, AND ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED WRITINGS OF GILBERT F. WHITE 15 (Ian
Burton & Robert W. Kates eds., 1986).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. In the interim, Congress passed the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956. However, the program
was never funded nor implemented, in part due to congressional fears that federal intervention would in
fact lure more people into the floodplain, resulting in increased damage from floods. Id. at 29; KLEIN &
ZELLMER, supra note 20, at 122–23.
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flood losses.”71 The report concluded that it would be proper for the federal government to subsidize flood insurance for existing floodplain property, “provided
owners of submarginal development were precluded from rebuilding destroyed
or obsolete structures on the flood plain.” The report warned that federal subsidies
for new floodplain investments would “aggravate flood damages and constitute
gross public irresponsibility.”72
Those warnings reflect an awareness of what the insurance refers to as “moral
hazard,” which one economist defined as “any situation in which one person
makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the
cost if things go badly.”73 When Congress passed the National Flood Insurance
Act of 1968, it heeded the task force’s warning. In particular, to avoid moral hazard, Congress incorporated three critical components into the NFIP: (1) temporary federal subsidies, (2) encouragement of state and local land-use regulation,
and (3) partial floodplain retreat over time.
1. Temporary Federal Subsidies
Through the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Congress recognized that
it was “uneconomic” for private industry to provide flood insurance on reasonable terms and conditions.74 It therefore authorized a public-private hybrid with
“large-scale participation” by the federal government in a flood insurance program that would be carried out “to the maximum extent practicable” by the private insurance industry.75 As originally designed, the NFIP would afford private
insurers the option to participate on a risk-sharing basis or simply as fiscal agents
who bore no financial risk.76
The legislation authorized the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (“HUD”)77 to investigate how risk premium rates should
be set.78 In some cases, premiums would be based on the actual risk involved,

71. TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL FLOOD CONTROL POLICY, A UNIFIED NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR
MANAGING FLOOD LOSSES 17 (1966), available at https://www.loc.gov/law/find/hearings/floods/
floods89-465.pdf. Congress was well aware that any insurance program—especially one with federal
subsidies—could “aggravate rather than ameliorate” flood danger by giving floodplain occupants a false
sense of security. Id. at 38.
72. Id. at 18.
73. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 63 (2009).
74. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1302(b).
75. Id. § 1302(b)(1) (referring to rates “based on a consideration of the respective risks involved,
including differences in risks due to land use measures, flood-proofing, flood forecasting, and similar
measures”).
76. Id. §§ 1331–32.
77. Id. § 1304 (authorizing the Secretary of HUD to “establish and carry out a national flood
insurance program”). Today, the program is administered by the Secretary of FEMA. NAT’L RES.
COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 29.
78. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1307.
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including coverage of the program’s operating and administrative expenses.79
These full-cost premiums would serve the goal of providing the insurance pool
with sufficient reserves to cover anticipated losses and discouraging risky floodplain development.80 In other cases, the act authorized subsidized premiums set
at less than full cost to establish “reasonable” rates that encourage people to purchase flood insurance.81 The NFIP’s tension between charging premiums that are
both “risk-based” and subsidized at “reasonable” rates continues to this day.82
The subsidies authorized by the founding legislation have taken two primary
forms. First, the program recognizes the so-called “pre-FIRM subsidy.” Under
this subsidy, the program can charge less than full-cost actuarial rates for properties that were built before the areas in which they are located were identified as
special flood hazard areas on “Flood Insurance Rate Maps” (“FIRMs”) prepared
and periodically revised by the federal government.83 These subsidies are borne
by federal taxpayers.84 Second, under the practice known as “grandfathering,”85
landowners are allowed to continue paying their current flood insurance rates
even if their property is subsequently mapped into a new (and presumably higher)
flood rate class, provided the property had complied with the building code and
standards in place at the time of construction.86 These grandfathered properties
constitute a cross-subsidy that is paid by other policyholders in the same rate
class, rather than by federal taxpayers.87

79. Id. § 1307(a)(1); see generally THOMAS L. HAYES & DAN R. SPAFFORD, ACTUARIAL RATE
REVIEW: IN SUPPORT OF THE MAY 1, 2008, RATE AND RULE CHANGES, https://www.fema.gov/medialibrary-data/20130726-1640-20490-7962/rate_rev2008.pdf (providing overview of how the NFIP
develops flood insurance rates).
80. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1308(b); NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 25
(quoting a 1966 report by HUD).
81. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 §1302(b)(2).
82. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 32.
83. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 4015(c). The special flood hazard areas, sometimes
described as the “100-year floodplain,” refer to areas that have a 1% or greater chance of flooding each
year. See supra text accompanying notes 56–58. Pre-FIRM subsidies also apply to properties
constructed or substantially improved before December 31, 1974, if later than the first FIRM for the
area. DIANE P. HORN & JARED T. BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44593, INTRODUCTION TO THE
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 15–16 (2018). As Horn and Brown explain,
The availability of this pre-FIRM subsidy was intended to allow preexisting floodplain properties
to contribute in some measure to prefunding their recovery from a flood disaster instead of relying
solely on federal disaster assistance. In essence, the flood insurance could distribute some of the financial burden among those protected by flood insurance and the public.

Id.
84. Id.
85. See NFIP Grandfathering Rules for Agents, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Mar. 2016),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1488482596393-dcc52e6c120c9327dcd75f1c08e802e4/
GrandfatheringForAgents_03_2016.pdf.
86. HORN & BROWN, supra note 83, at 17–18.
87. Id. at 18.

300

THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:285

Realizing that subsidized insurance premiums could have negative impacts,
the 1968 House Report on the pending legislation asserted, “Any Federal ‘subsidy’ which will accrue under the insurance program to the benefit of property
owners now occupying the flood plain is defensible only as part of an interim solution to long-range readjustments in land use . . . .”88 In contrast to subsidies for
existing floodplain structures, the House Report explained that subsidies for new
properties were “not at all valid.”89 A 1967 report of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency projected that federal subsidies would gradually disappear
as the private insurance industry assumed an ever-increasing role in the program.
The Committee predicted that existing properties insured at subsidized rates
would gradually be replaced by new or improved properties subject to full-cost
premiums. Eventually, the Committee concluded, the federal government would
have no liability, expenses, or losses.90
The 1966 task force report that gave rise to the NFIP originally estimated that
federal subsidization of the cost of flood premiums for existing high-risk properties would be required for a limited period of time only—approximately twentyfive years.91 In hindsight, that prediction would prove to be wildly optimistic.92
By about 1978, it became apparent that private insurers would not become risksharing participants and the federal government assumed the full risk of the program (although private insurers continued to assist in administration and policy
writing).93 As risk-sharing private partners failed to materialize, so too did the
hope for the elimination of subsidies. Today, many flood insurance policyholders
continue to enjoy subsidized, below-cost rates.94
2. Land-Use Regulation
How did Congress expect private insurers would be able to provide economical
insurance at some future date? The key lies in the state and local land-use regulations that Congress envisioned as the centerpiece of the national flood insurance
program. In the statute’s statement of purpose, Congress found that “a program of
flood insurance can promote the public interest by providing appropriate protection against the perils of flood losses and encouraging sound land-use by minimizing exposure of property to flood losses . . . .”95 In fact, federal insurance
88. H.R. Rep. No. 90–1585, at 2969 (1968) (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 28–29 (quoting a 1967 report of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency); see also H.R. Rep. No. 90-1585, at 2973. (predicting private insurers would
take over the bulk of the program, charging full, risk-based actuarial premiums, and “the government
will have no liability for expenses or losses, except with respect to reinsurance against catastrophic
losses”).
91. AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra note 16, at 9.
92. See infra Part I.C.
93. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 29.
94. See infra Part I.C.
95. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 82 Stat. at 573.
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would be available only to participating communities that provided satisfactory
assurances that they were adopting permanent land-use and control measures,96
with effective enforcement mechanisms, in conformity with federal criteria to be
developed by the Secretary of HUD.97 Further, the law made federal disaster assistance unavailable for losses covered by the flood insurance program, or that
could have been so covered by landowners in participating communities, with
exceptions for low-income individuals.98
3. Partial Floodplain Retreat
Thus, state and local land-use regulation was an essential cornerstone of the
NFIP. Such regulation would perform at least two critical functions, as stated in
the declaration of purpose contained in Section 1302(e) of the National Flood
Insurance Act. First, it would “constrict the development of land which is
exposed to flood damage and minimize damage caused by flood losses.”99
Second, regulation would “guide the development of proposed future construction, where practicable, away from locations which are threatened by flood hazards.”100 If fully implemented, these “constrict” and “guide away” principles
could have done much to protect lives and property from floodwaters, as well as
to insulate the federal treasury from unsustainable costs. Instead, regulatory
efforts were thwarted by many factors, including a growing antipathy toward regulation and the rise of the regulatory and physical takings doctrines.101
C.

LOOKING BACK: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS

As the NFIP marked its fiftieth anniversary in 2018, it had over five million
policies in effect, which provide about $1.28 trillion in coverage.102 Overall,
about 22,315 communities, representing fifty-six states and jurisdictions, participate in the program.103 FEMA estimates that the floodplain and building regulations enacted by participating communities have avoided almost two billion
dollars in flood losses annually.104 Nevertheless, the program has failed to live up
to its promise. In particular, it has deviated from three of its fundamental premises: (1) the charging of subsidized premiums on a temporary basis only; (2) the
implementation of permanent, local land-use regulations to minimize exposure of

96. Id. at 574.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 579.
99. Id. at 573.
100. Id.
101. See infra Part III.
102. HORN & BROWN, supra note 83, at 1 (citing data as of February 2018).
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing data as of March 2018, and estimating annual avoided flood losses to be $1.87
billion).
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property to flood losses; and (3) the constriction of floodplain development and
the guiding of future construction away from flood hazard areas.105
First, the 1968 House Report for the new flood insurance legislation defended
federal premium subsidies as only “interim solutions to long-range adjustments
in land-use.”106 Fifty years later, about 30% to 40% of all policyholders continued
to receive some type of subsidy.107 The Congressional Budget Office estimates
that these discounts reduce premiums paid to the federal government by about
seventy million dollars.108 As a result of continuing subsidies and of rates too low
to cover catastrophic storms and hurricanes, the program was more than twenty
billion dollars in debt to the federal treasury as of early 2018.109 This is true even
after the Treasury Department forgave an additional sixteen billion dollars of
debt incurred after Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017.110
Second, even though communities must enact a baseline level of floodplain
regulations to qualify for federal flood insurance, the nation’s overall exposure
of property to flood loss continues to increase. From 1960 to 2008, the number of
housing units along the coast increased 225%.111 Due to the combined impacts of
more coastal development and sea level rise, FEMA predicts that the coastal areas
at high risk of floods will increase 55% by 2100.112 At the same time, FEMA
predicts that the population in such high risk coastal areas will increase 140%
by 2100.113 As a result, the nation continues to face more—rather than less—
exposure to flooding over time.114
Finally, local regulations have not been sufficient to guide future construction
away from flood hazard areas.115 Current mapping is not adequate to accurately
identify flood hazard areas, hampering attempts to guide future construction
105. See supra Part I.B.
106. See supra text accompanying note 88.
107. HORN & BROWN, supra note 83, at 15–18. As of September 2016, about 16.1% of all
policyholders received what are known as “pre-FIRM subsidies.” Amendments to the NFIP call for the
gradual phasing out of these subsidies to actuarially sound rates. An additional 3.9% of policyholders
receive a “newly mapped subsidy” introduced by 2015 amendments to the NFIP. This subsidy will also
be phased out over time until full-risk rates are achieved. An additional 10-20% of policyholders are
“grandfathered” in at below-cost rates, but these are considered to be “cross subsidies” because they are
paid for by other policyholders, rather than by federal taxpayers. Id.
108. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: FINANCIAL
SOUNDNESS AND AFFORDABILITY 35, Appendix B (2017), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/
53028.
109. See supra text accompanying note 4.
110. National Flood Insurance Program, supra note 4 (placing FEMA’s debt at $20.5 billion as of
February 2018).
111. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, OVERWHELMING RISK: RETHINKING FLOOD INSURANCE IN A
WORLD OF RISING SEAS 1, 4 (2013), available at https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
assets/documents/global_warming/Overwhelming-Risk-Full-Report.pdf.
112. Id. at 3 (citing an increase from 16.1 million units in 1960 to 36.3 million units in 2008).
113. Id.
114. FEMA predicts that population growth will cause 30% of this increased risk, whereas sea level
rise will cause 70% of the increase. Id.
115. See infra Parts I.B.2–.3.
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away from it. For example, current maps identify flood hazard areas using present
conditions only.116 But, as more development is added to the floodplain, permeable surfaces are paved over, expanding the geographic area subject to flood hazard.117 Moreover, as asserted by the Association of State Floodplain Managers,
the minimum NFIP standards are insufficient to keep up with mounting flood
losses for a variety of reasons, including:118 (1) the NFIP regulates only the 1%chance floodplain rather than the more conservative 0.2%-chance floodplain
(sometimes called the “five hundred year floodplain”); (2) the NFIP generally
allows new construction in the 1%-chance floodplain as long as structures are elevated one foot above the predicted base flood level119—creating what one could
call a “vertical retreat” from the floodplain; (3) flood hazard maps generally do
not include “residual risk” areas that are geographically within a floodplain but
are protected by a levee—creating a type of “levee loophole.” If the levee fails, or
if flooding occurs at levels beyond that which the levee was designed to protect
against, then damage can be catastrophic.120 As a result of these deficiencies,
flood losses increasingly occur outside the boundaries of mapped flood hazard
areas, catching many property owners by surprise and uninsured, as happened in
the Houston area during Hurricane Harvey in Fall 2017.
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FLOODPLAIN AND COASTAL DEVELOPMENT
This Article considers two perverse incentives for floodplain development that
skew otherwise rational, risk-avoiding behavior: the National Flood Insurance
Program as currently implemented and the Fifth Amendment takings doctrine.
Considerations of political economy help to explain why the NFIP and the takings
doctrine have evolved into potent forces that lure people into harm’s way, despite
otherwise laudable goals.121 As used in this Article, “political economy” refers to
the influence of political forces on the development of economic policy.122
Political considerations are often at the heart of economic decisionmaking. They
116. ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, FLOOD MAP MODERNIZATION 19 (2008), available
at https://www.floods.org/ace-files/Projects/Bldg_State_Capacity.pdf. FEMA has only recently begun
to map “future conditions,” but for informational purposes only at the request of participating
communities. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FUTURE-CONDITIONS HYDROLOGY FINAL RULE
(2001), available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/7287.
117. ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 116.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 56–58, 95–98.
119. ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 116, at 16.
120. See 100 RESILIENT CITIES, STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 11
(2017), available at http://www.100resilientcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Resilient-Cities-standalone-ch3_revised_11.7.17.pdf (explaining that “[i]ncreased impervious coverage and development in
floodplains, changing rainfall patterns with more frequent heavy rains in some areas, and sea-level rise are
factors contributing to [an] increase in flooding [in places outside of mapped flood hazard areas]”).
121. See supra Part I.C.
122. See generally Alberto F. Alesina, Political Economy, 2007 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES.
REPORTER 3, available at http://www.nber.org/reporter/2007number3/ (explaining that “[o]ne of the
central themes in political economics has been and continues to be the effect of different political
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frequently result in policies that provide concentrated benefits to politically
powerful, highly-organized groups. At the same time, the costs are often widely
dispersed among those who wield less political influence or who are less tightly
organized.123
A.

IN HARM’S WAY

The nation’s floodplains and coastal zones (together, “floodplains”) are risky—
even deadly—places in which to live and conduct business. Over the past century,
flood damage has risen dramatically to about eight billion dollars each year.124
Floods are also among the nation’s deadliest natural disasters, causing an average
of eighty-five U.S. deaths annually over the past thirty years.125 Despite the known
risks, we continue to live and build in flood-prone areas. Experts predict continued
increases in flood damage, as sea levels rise, storms intensify, and development
continues in known high-risk flood areas.126 One sobering analysis projects that by
2100, the U.S. assets exposed to flood damage will be of a value equivalent to
today’s entire gross domestic product.127
What percentage of the population lives in a floodplain? Estimates vary
widely, but about 10% to 13% of the U.S. population lives in high-risk flood areas
known as the 1%-chance floodplain.128 An even higher percentage of the
institutions on economic outcomes” and identifying “strategic manipulation of policies (especially fiscal
policy)” as a traditional topic of political economics).
123. Id. at 2 (explaining that political economics departs from a “traditional model of economic
policy in which benevolent social planners maximize the utility of a representative individual” and
instead focuses on “how political forces affected the choice of policies, paying special attention to
distributive conflicts and political institutions”).
124. ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 33. This damage estimate does not
include the severe storms of 2017, including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. Hydrologic
Information Center—Flood Loss Data, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. http://www.nws.noaa.
gov/hic/ (last visited July 22, 2018) (adjusted to 2014 inflation). Up to $2.9 trillion worth of assets in the
United States are exposed to flood risk (equivalent to about 15.3% of the United States’ total gross
domestic product). Oliver E.J. Wing et al., Estimates of Present and Future Flood Risk in the
Conterminous United States, 2018 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 13 2–3 (2018), available at http://iopscience.
iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aaac65/pdf. As with other flood data, estimates vary widely. Id.
(presenting range of estimates from other sources).
125. From 1988 through 2017, floods caused an average of eighty-five deaths each year in the United
States, second only to heat-related fatalities in terms of weather fatalities (thirty-year average of 134
deaths annually). See Weather Fatalities 2017, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/
hazstats.shtml (last visited July 22, 2018). For that period, floods and hurricanes together caused an
average of 132 deaths annually. See 78-Year List of Severe Weather Fatalities, NAT’L WEATHER SERV.,
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/hazstats/resources/weather_fatalities.pdf (last visited July 22, 2018).
126. Beyond structural damage, flood costs include such things as job loss, particularly for small
businesses, which have a 40% failure rate after major floods. ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS,
supra note 33. Fortunately, flood deaths have declined due to factors such as better weather forecasting,
improved warning systems, and increased awareness of flood danger. Id. at 4.
127. Wing et al., supra note 124, at 5.
128. FEMA estimates that thirteen million Americans live within the 1%-chance floodplain, whereas a
2018 study conducted by the University of Bristol, the Nature Conservancy, and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency places the estimate at forty-one million Americans. Michael Isaac Stein, New Report
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population is at risk if one adds in the population of the 0.2%-chance floodplain,
which has a one in five hundred chance of flooding each year (sometimes called
the “five hundred year floodplain.”)129 State-level data show considerable variation. One study focused on what it termed the “combined floodplain,” which
encompassed both the 1%-chance and 0.2%-chance floodplains.130 That study
showed that anywhere from 1% to 64% of each state’s population lives in vulnerable areas.131 Contrary to what the study described as the “popular perception that
floodplains are mostly a problem for coastal areas,” it found that inland states
were among those with the highest percentage of their population in the combined floodplain, including Arizona (64%) and North Dakota (20%).132 Further,
the study found that two-thirds of the country’s combined floodplain population
lived in just five states: California, Florida, Arizona, Texas, and New York.133
Thus, if a handful of high-floodplain-population states can organize their political
power effectively, they stand to gain most from floodplain subsidies provided by
the diffuse group of federal taxpayers throughout the country. On the other hand,
when disaster strikes, they have more lives and property at risk than lower-floodplain-population states.
Who lives in a floodplain? Floodplain populations sorted by race/ethnicity and
poverty levels show some deviations from those groups’ percentage representation in the United States population as a whole.134 A 2018 study released by
FEMA found that households within the highest flood-prone areas had a somewhat lower annual median income ($50,000) than households outside those
flood-prone areas ($57,000).135 Analysis based on census tract data also revealed
some differences. As one study explained, “in some cases, waterfront areas may
be desirable and expensive, and attract higher-income residents; whereas other
floodplain areas may be less desirable, and thus more affordable for households
with lower incomes.”136 In addition to looking at those who occupy the
Says FEMA Badly Underestimates Flood Risk, CITYLAB (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/
environment/2018/03/new-report-says-fema-badly-underestimates-flood-risk/554627/ (explaining that
FEMA’s flood maps, which “dictate flood risk management” in the United States, have been “widely
criticized for being outdated and underestimating the country’s flood risk”); see also Wing et al., supra
note 124, at 13 (estimating that 13.3% of the U.S. population is exposed to a 100-year flood).
129. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DEFINITIONS OF FEMA FLOOD ZONE DESIGNATIONS,
available at https://efotg.sc.egov.usda.gov/references/public/NM/FEMA_FLD_HAZ_guide.pdf, (last
visited Jan. 22, 2019).
130. NYU FURMAN CTR., POPULATION IN THE U.S. FLOODPLAINS (2017), available at http://
furmancenter.org/research/publication/population-in-the-us-floodplains.
131. Id. at 6–7.
132. Id. at 2. In order of highest state percentage in the combined floodplain, the top four states were
Arizona (64%), Florida (26%), North Dakota (20%), and Louisiana (17%).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2–5.
135. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, AN AFFORDABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 11 (2017), available at https://www.eenews.net/assets/2018/04/17/
document_gw_06.pdf.
136. NYU FURMAN CTR., supra note 130, at 4.
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floodplain, it is useful to consider those who purchase federal flood insurance.
Overall, policyholders tend to be higher income people.137 Further, subsidies for
below-cost premiums under the NFIP disproportionately benefit people of higher
income.138
Why do people choose to locate in flood-prone areas? The answers are many and
varied. Some river and coastal areas provide access to ports and harbors as well as
scenic, recreational, and tourist amenities. Other low-lying areas offer affordable
real estate that attracts development and settlement. Still other floodplain occupants
can withstand occasional flooding, such as farmers who construct permanent buildings on higher ground and till the fertile river valleys. In other cases, people are simply unaware of the flood risk, underestimate the danger it poses to them, or dismiss
past floods as never-to-be-repeated anomalies. When local governments issue building permits for construction in the floodplain, such approval perpetuates residents’
belief that it is safe to occupy them. And in yet other cases, the availability of federal
flood insurance and federal disaster relief, as well as the presence of federal levees,
reservoirs, and other flood control structures, may give people a false sense of security that lures them into potential danger.139
B.

THE PUZZLE OF HOUSTON

The example of devastating flooding in the Houston area in 2017 illuminates
competing currents that shape the nation’s approach to floods and sheds light on
who stands to win and lose from floodplain development. It also shows how various forces can discourage enactment of floodplain regulations critical to the success of the NFIP. In particular, the Houston puzzle shows how a desire to
preserve the local tax base and economy can combine with a fear of Fifth
Amendment takings liability to create a potent deterrent to the adoption of lifeand property-saving floodplain regulations. The policies that emerge are perhaps
better understood as products of the political economy rather than of logical planning by wise and benevolent officials.
In August to September of 2017, Hurricane Harvey deluged southeastern
Texas with more than sixty inches of rain.140 Harris County, which includes
137. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., supra note 108, at 20–21 (“CBO’s analysis suggests that, on
average, NFIP policy–holders tend to live in places where people have higher income.”).
138. Ike Brannon & Ari Blask, The Government’s Hidden Housing Subsidy for the Rich, POLITICO
(Aug. 8, 2017, 5:38 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/08/08/hidden-subsidy-richflood-insurance-000495; see Christopher Flavelle, Latest Climate Threat for Coastal Cities: More Rich
People, BLOOMBERG (last updated Apr. 23, 2018, 10:47 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-04-23/the-latest-climate-threat-for-coastal-cities-more-rich-people; Omri Ben-Shahar &
Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571, 596
(2016).
139. See supra Part I.A.1.
140. ERIC S. BLAKE & DAVID A. ZELINSKY, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER TROPICAL CYCLONE
REPORT: HURRICANE HARVEY 1 (2018), available at https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092017_Harvey.
pdf.
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Houston, was particularly hard-hit. Hurricane Harvey was directly responsible
for at least sixty-eight deaths, which was the highest death toll directly related to
a tropical cyclone in Texas since 1919.141 Hurricane Harvey also broke flood
damage records: As of 2017, it ranked as the second-costliest hurricane to strike
the United States, falling behind only Hurricane Katrina of 2005.142
The Houston area has a long history of flooding and suffers from one of the
highest rates of flood deaths and property damage in the country.143 After devastating floods in 1929 and 1935, the federal government agreed to build and to pay
for flood control structures to protect the city and its surroundings. By the 1940s,
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) had built two reservoirs—Addicks
and Barker—about twenty miles northwest and upstream of Houston, which were
designed to catch and store floodwaters during heavy storms and then safely
release them downstream in a gradual and controlled flow.144 The reservoirs
employed a unique design: Gently sloping levees of compacted soil serve as
dams to hold back floodwaters, rather than the more traditional, taller concrete
dams.145 As a result, land within the reservoirs and their “flood pools” can be used
during dry periods for recreation, sports fields, and the like.146 When it built the
reservoirs, the Corps purchased only about 24,500 acres of surrounding land, falling about 8,000 acres short of the total area that could be inundated if the reservoirs reached maximum capacity during extreme storms—a decision that would
have devastating repercussions more than seventy years later when Hurricane
Harvey struck.147 At the time though, the 8,000 acre shortfall seemed harmless
enough; the additional privately-owned lands were prairie used for cattle grazing
and crops that could likely tolerate occasional flooding.148 But since that time,

141. Id.
142. Id. (comparing costs as adjusted for inflation).
143. See Al Shaw et al., Why Houston Isn’t Ready for Harvey, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 25, 2017), https://
projects.propublica.org/graphics/harvey. According to Sam Brody, a natural hazards mitigation
researcher at Texas A&M University at Galveston, “More people die here than anywhere else from
floods. . . . More property per capita is lost here. And the problem is getting worse.” Suggested causes
include local population growth, relaxed building regulations, paving of rainwater-absorbing prairie,
increased storm intensity, and climate change. Id.
144. Michael F. Bloom, The History of Addicks and Barker Reservoirs, RIPARIANHOUSTON (Sept. 3,
2017), https://riparianhouston.com/2017/09/03/the-history-of-addicks/. The full cost of the reservoirs
would have been borne by the federal government. See JOSEPH L. ARNOLD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE
1936 FLOOD CONTROL ACT Foreword (1988), available at https://www.publications.usace.army.
mil/Portals/76/Publications/EngineerPamphlets/EP_870-1-29.pdf (explaining that through the 1936
legislation Congress established a local government cost-sharing requirement for channel and levee
flood control measures, but the federal government assumed all costs of reservoir flood storage
projects).
145. Bloom, supra note 144.
146. See Neena Satija et al., Everyone Knew Houston’s Reservoirs Would Flood—Except for the
People Who Bought Homes Inside Them, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 12, 2017), https://projects.propublica.org/
graphics/harvey-reservoirs.
147. See id.
148. Id.
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Houston and Harris County officials issued building permits for the construction
of thousands of new homes within the reservoirs and their flood pools.149
Development continued throughout the greater Houston area. Adjacent to the
Addicks Reservoir watershed, homes in the upper White Oak watershed flooded
in 1998, 2000, and 2002.150 Some blamed the flooding on the area’s explosive
growth. About four hundred homeowners sued Harris County for its approval of
unmitigated growth.151 In particular, they alleged that the County’s permitting of
upstream development without a flood control plan or other mitigation measures
had “taken” their property without just compensation.152 The Texas Supreme
Court rejected those claims, holding that plaintiffs had failed to prove more than
“mere negligent conduct” by demonstrating the County’s actions were “substantially certain” to cause flooding to the specific properties owned by the
plaintiffs.153
Unchastised, Houston and Harris County continued to grow, and the area continued to flood. Tropical Storm Allison of 2001 was particularly devastating, killing twenty-two people and causing over five billion dollars of property
damage.154 This time, regulators chose to act. In 2006, Houston amended its ordinances to regulate development within floodways.155 But the city’s resolve was
short-lived. Nearby landowners sued the city, claiming that the ordinance worked
a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment.156 Fearful of potential liability,
the city withdrew its ordinance and later promulgated a less protective version.157
Thus, the takings doctrine deterred stringent regulation by Houston. At the same
time, the doctrine had failed to provide an impetus for Harris County regulators
to protect the White Oak watershed.
By 2017, Houston and Harris County had sanctioned extensive development in
many vulnerable areas. When Hurricane Harvey struck, about 14,000 homes—
149. Id.
150. See Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2016).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Harris County’s Flooding History, HARRIS CTY. FLOOD CONTROL DIST., https://www.hcfcd.
org/flooding-floodplains/harris-countys-flooding-history/ (last visited July 25, 2018). In its aftermath, a
2003 report by the Harris County Flood Control District acknowledged that up to 2000 homes within
Addicks and Barker Reservoirs would have flooded if the rain had fallen in a different location within
the county. Id. (quoting report’s statement, “If the intense rainfall . . . had occurred over Barker and
Addicks Reservoirs, record flood heights exceeding previous records by five to eight feet would have
occurred”) (internal citation omitted).
155. See Mark Collette & Matt Dempsey, What’s in Houston’s Worst Flood Zones? Development
Worth $13.5 Billion, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/What-s-in-a-floodway-In-Houston-20-000-12409821.php. The Association of
Floodplain Managers defines a floodway as “the channel of a river or stream, plus the adjacent land
needed to carry away floodwaters. It has some of the fastest-moving water during a flood.” Id.
156. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Noonan, No. 01–08–01030–CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3547, at
*6 (Tex. App. May 21, 2009) (holding plaintiff’s claim ripe for review).
157. Collette & Dempsey, supra note 155.
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many of them upscale—were sitting within the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs.
These properties were in areas that had been designed to flood during high rains
and that had been marked on plat maps as areas of possible “controlled inundation.”158 During Harvey, over 5,000 of these homes flooded.159 But because these
areas had never flooded significantly before Hurricane Harvey, many homeowners (and the real estate agents who had sold them the properties) professed ignorance of the flood risk they faced.160
After Hurricane Harvey, Houston enacted a more stringent ordinance to regulate floodplain development.161 This ordinance does not prohibit new floodplain
development, but requires that it be elevated at least two feet above projected
flood levels in the 0.2%-chance floodplain.162 As with the ill-fated 2006 regulation, some opposed the stricter 2018 ordinance, claiming that it hurts business
interests by increasing construction costs and that it might negatively impact the
tax base.163 But this time, rather than withdrawing the ordinance, some council
members pushed back, stating, “[w]e’re not going to put profit over the lives of
people,”164 and passed the regulation with a nine to seven vote.165 They cited to a
study indicating that the new ordinance would have protected 84% of the thousands of homes flooded during Hurricane Harvey.166
But no sooner had the ink dried on the new floodplain regulation, than the
Houston city council paved the way for construction of yet another 800 new
homes in the 1%-chance floodplain by approving a new municipal utility district

158. See Satija et al., supra note 146. A plat map “shows how a tract of land is divided into lots. It is
drawn to scale and shows the land’s size, boundary locations, nearby streets, flood zones, and any
easements or rights of way. . . . It is . . . typically included in the paperwork you get when you buy a
home.” Lisa Gordon, What is a Plat Map? It Tells You a Lot About Your Property, REALTOR.COM (Apr.
12, 2017), https://www.realtor.com/advice/buy/what–is–a–plat–map/.
159. See Satija et al., supra note 146. Other sources estimated the number of flooded homes within
the reservoir at over 9,000. See, e.g., Mihir Zaveri, Army Corps Predicted Addicks and Barker Flood
Pool Lawsuits, Decided Not to Act, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
news/politics/houston/article/Army-Corps-predicted-Addicks-and-Barker-flood-12714844.php.
160. See The Difference Between Upstream and Downstream Flooding Related to the Addicks &
Barker Reservoirs, ZEHL & ASSOCS., https://www.zehllaw.com/the-difference-between-upstream-anddownstream-flooding-related-addicks-barker-reservoirs/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2018).
161. Forward–Thinking Building Rules Protect Houston From Disaster, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT.
AGENCY (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2018/04/13/forward-thinking-buildingrules-protect-houston-disaster. Harris County had previously amended its floodplain regulations.
Edward Klump & Mike Lee, Houston Sees “Defining Moment” With New Regulations, E&E NEWS
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/04/05/stories/1060078211.
162. Id. The previous ordinance required that new construction in the 1%-chance floodplain be
elevated one foot but placed no such requirements on construction in the 0.2%-chance floodplain. Id.
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Klump & Lee, supra note 161.
166. Id.
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to service it.167 Although the plan complied with the city’s new regulation, the
new utility district would facilitate development in the same watershed where
2,300 homes had flooded during Hurricane Harvey. This was also where the city
had spent $10.7 million to buy out floodplain homes damaged during Hurricane
Harvey.168 The Houston Chronicle published a scathing editorial while the proposal was still pending, opining that “[e]ven with the new post-Harvey land-use
rules, construction in the floodplain will still risk exacerbating downstream flooding” and noting that “[a]t a time when Houston is lobbying the federal government for billions of dollars in disaster recovery funds, allowing this proposal to
sail through City Council would be a startling act of bad faith.”169
Meanwhile, more than 1,500 flooded landowners above and below the
Addicks and Barker reservoirs brought a class action against the Corps, seeking
potentially billions of dollars for flood damages resulting in the wake of
Hurricane Harvey. The upstream landowners claim the federal government
“stored” stormwater on their property when rainwater filled the reservoirs and
seek compensation for the permanent, physical taking of their property as well as
the taking of drainage easements.170 The downstream owners claim the Corps
took private property without compensation when it made controlled releases
from the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs, despite the fact that unprecedented
stormwater inflows threatened to surge around the dams.171
The Houston example poses a difficult puzzle as to which groups, if any,
should be held accountable when flood damage occurs: homeowners and business
owners who locate in floodplains, developers who build in floodplains, local governments that approve building permits within floodplains or fail to enact sufficiently stringent floodplain regulations, or the federal government as operator of
flood control infrastructure that causes (or fails to prevent) flooding. But such
questions of after-the-fact blame tend to deflect the more fundamental issue of
how local, state, and federal officials can work together prophylactically to keep

167. See Dan Singer, City Council Approves MUD for 800 New Homes on Pine Crest Golf Course,
SWAMPLOT (Apr. 25, 2018, 12:00 PM), http://swamplot.com/city-council-approves-mud-for-800-newhomes-on-pine-crest-golf-course/2018-04-25/.
168. Mark Collette & Matt Dempsey, What’s in Houston’s Worst Flood Zones, Development Worth
$13.5 Billion, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/
houston/article/What-s-in-a-floodway-In-Houston-20-000-12409821.php.
169. Has City Hall Learned Nothing From Harvey?, HOUS. CHRON. (last updated Apr. 24, 2018, 9:45
AM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Has-City-Hall-learned-nothingfrom-Harvey-12858201.php.
170. See ZEHL & ASSOCS., supra note 160. Physical takings are discussed infra Part III.B.2.
171. ZEHL & ASSOCS., supra note 160; see also In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.) Flood–
Control Reservoirs, Case No. 1:17–cv–09001–CFL, United States’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, at 3–4 (Feb. 16, 2018)
(arguing that plaintiffs “implicitly maintain that the Corps should have directed floodwaters elsewhere—
elsewhere being on to some other person’s private property—in order to protect Plaintiffs’ own property”
and asserting that “the Fifth Amendment is not a constitutional flood insurance policy”).
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people safe and out of harm’s way and to minimize storm damage when the rains
and hurricanes inevitably come.
C.

WINNERS AND LOSERS

To make sense of the Houston story and to extract broader lessons from it, this
section considers briefly what various stakeholders stand to gain or lose from
floodplain development. In some cases, the same group may be exposed to both
potential gains and potential losses. This section also shows how the takings
doctrine—both regulatory and physical—has been used as a blunt instrument that
distorts flood policy. This analysis can help inform how best to move forward in
removing perverse incentives to making safe and rationale use of the nation’s
floodplains.172
1. Homeowners
As suggested by the Houston story, floodplain homeowners have the most at
stake from floodplain development. Although they may enjoy the benefits of their
neighborhoods during dry times, their lives and property are endangered when
the area floods. Further, although flood victims may receive federal disaster relief
and flood insurance payouts, it is difficult for money alone to make up for the loss
of one’s home or the disruption of one’s life.
Many do not even know they live within a floodplain and therefore do not
make an informed choice to accept the attendant risks. FEMA rules allow areas
to be excluded from special flood hazard area designation on flood maps if the
areas are elevated above a certain 1%-chance flood level.173 As a consequence,
flood risk notification requirements and flood insurance purchase requirements
may not apply.174 In Houston, for example, many developers took advantage of
this provision to fill properties with soil to elevate them slightly above the natural
floodplain.175 According to one analysis, Hurricane Harvey damaged at least
6,000 such properties that were technically removed (vertically) from the flood
zone through filling, but which flooded nevertheless.176
2. Developers and Real Estate Agents
Stakeholders such as developers and real estate agents may benefit from the
construction or sale of floodplain property, but do not own it long-term. As a
172. See infra Part IV.
173. See supra text accompanying note 119.
174. See John Schwartz, James Glanz, & Andrew W. Lehren, Builders Said Their Homes Were Out
of a Flood Zone. Then Harvey Came, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/
us/houston-flood-zone-hurricane-harvey.html.
175. See id.
176. Id. (quoting statement of a former director of the Association of State Floodplain Managers in
Wisconsin, “Once a flood plain, always a flood plain. [The area has] still got risk.”).
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result, they may realize a significant economic benefit from floodplain development, but they suffer only short-term exposure to the flood risk. They form concentrated and powerful lobbying groups and are able to strongly oppose stringent
floodplain regulations.
3. Local Governments
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 relied primarily on local government officials to constrict floodplain development and guide it to safer ground
through local land-use ordinances.177 Although many local communities have
enacted regulations stringent enough to qualify for flood insurance offered and
subsidized by the federal government, few have gone beyond the bare minimum.
Because many of FEMA’s floodplain maps are outdated or inaccurate, minimum
regulation is often insufficient to provide an adequate margin of safety for local
residents.178 In Houston, areas outside the officially designated flood zones routinely flood. An area known as “Memorial City,” for example, experienced serious flooding three times in less than a decade, even though it is not within a flood
zone designated on FEMA maps.179 Local governments can be reluctant to regulate floodplain development. Many are concerned about maintaining a healthy
tax base.180 Further, actual or threatened takings litigation by regulated landowners can deter risk-adverse local governments from enacting strict regulations.
In Houston, for example, when landowners filed lawsuits claiming that 2006
floodplain regulations constituted a regulatory taking requiring compensation, the
city withdrew its ordinance and subsequently reissued a weaker version.181
4. The Federal Government
As a result of the above-described forces, the federal government and federal
taxpayers bear the burden of floodplain development, whereas others enjoy its
benefits. Before floods occur, the federal government provides flood control
structures (such as the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs above Houston) and federally-subsidized flood insurance.182 After flooding, the federal government
provides disaster relief.183 If things go wrong with its flood control structures,
the federal government may be subject to lawsuits by landowners alleging that
177. See supra Part I.B.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 115–20.
179. See Neena Satija et al., Boomtown, Flood Town, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2016), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/houston-cypress/. This so-called “urban flooding” outside designated
1%-chance or 0.2%-chance floodplains may result from outdated flood maps, climate change, or
continued development that paves over prairies and other natural areas that formerly absorbed and
slowed storm water runoff. Id.
180. See id.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 155–57.
182. See supra Part I.A.
183. See supra Part I.A.2.
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the flooding of their property constituted a “physical taking” that requires
potentially multi-millions of dollars in compensation184—a legal theory related
to the “regulatory takings” lawsuits that have challenged many state and local
regulations, such as floodplain building requirements.
Overall, this creates a de facto system of floodplain management that departs
significantly from the vision of the 1968 Congress that enacted the National
Flood Insurance Act.185 The benefits of floodplain development have been privatized, and the costs have been socialized and spread among federal taxpayers.186
The existing system creates “moral hazard,”187 whereby people take more risks
than they otherwise would if they had to bear the full costs of their actions. Under
this skewed system, many floodplain occupants have been lured into the path of
dangerous floodwaters.
III. THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE: A SHADOW INSURANCE POLICY?
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.188

The NFIP was authorized in 1968. Within about a decade, the United States
Supreme Court would begin to decide a number of cases that ushered in the modern era of takings jurisprudence.189 Among those decisions, two stand out as challenges to precisely the type of floodplain and coastal regulation essential to the
success of the NFIP. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles
County190 involved the regulation of development within a river’s floodplain. The
second case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,191 involved development
restrictions along coastal areas prone to hurricanes and storm surge. Many other

184. See infra Part III.B.2.
185. See supra Part I.A.3.
186. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, INC., BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR FLOODPLAIN
MANAGEMENT: GUIDEBOOK 10 (2010), available at http://www.floods.org/ace–files/documentlibrary/
Publications/BPS_Guidebook_2_1_10.pdf (describing incentives for developers and property owners to
try to “move [the financial costs that come with developments that don’t follow the rules or that have an
adverse impact on others] from themselves and into the public realm” and explaining, “[t]his is called
‘externalizing’ the costs of development, and when these costs are pushed over to government,
sometimes called ‘socializing’ the costs”).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 73.
188. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
189. James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 35, 52 (identifying Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) as
“the first of the modern takings cases, and the first to make clear that regulatory measures could result in
implicit takings” as opposed to explicit takings of property through eminent domain) (emphasis in
original).
190. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
191. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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A comparison of the goals of the takings doctrine and the NFIP.

takings challenges would follow in the Supreme Court as well as in the lower federal and state courts.
As shown in Figure 1, the goals of the takings doctrine and the NFIP are fundamentally at odds: Whereas the NFIP was designed to internalize the costs of risky
development by placing them on those who enjoy its benefits,192 the takings doctrine seeks to externalize the costs of unwise development by placing them on
government regulators and actors.193 Similarly, whereas the NFIP encourages
state and local land-use regulation as an integral part of its cooperative federalism scheme, the takings doctrine provides a basis to challenge that regulation
(and other governmental actions) as unconstitutional, unless compensation is
provided. Finally, whereas the NFIP attempts to constrict flood-prone development and guide it away from areas of known risk, the takings doctrine scrutinizes uncompensated development restrictions and seeks to declare them
unconstitutional.
As this Part will argue, the modern takings doctrine articulated by the Supreme
Court was almost perfectly tailored to cripple the fledgling flood insurance program. Importantly, this Article does not argue that local governments never overreach when enacting land-use regulations, nor does it argue that the federal
government flawlessly designs and operates levees, reservoirs, and other flood
control structures. Rather, this Article suggests that the takings doctrine often acts
at cross-purposes with the NFIP by allowing landowners to enjoy the benefits of
floodplain development, while shifting the costs of flood risk onto government
actors and taxpayers—a scheme that some have described as “socializing” flood

192. See supra Parts I.A.3, I.B.
193. Even where a particular development or type of development is acknowledged as contrary to the
public interest, the takings doctrine would recognize a compensation requirement in cases where the
impact on the landowner was too severe. See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.1.
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risk.194 As a result, floodplain users may take more risks than they otherwise
would if they bore the full costs of their actions, serving as a perverse incentive to
lure more people into harm’s way.
A.

THE DESIGN: UPSHIFTING COSTS TO TAXPAYERS

First English and Lucas illustrate how the takings doctrine can weaken the
NFIP. In each case, the Court applied three analytical techniques that send a
strong signal to state and local governments that floodplain and coastal regulations can be costly to them. First, a majority of the Court was eager to reach a
legal issue despite vigorous dissents suggesting the issue was premature and not
squarely before the Court.195 Second, the Court weakened the traditional presumption in favor of the constitutionality of legislative enactments, in part by
casting doubt on the good faith of government regulators.196 Finally, the Court
signaled its willingness to discourage regulation that severely restricted land-use,
even if there was no dispute that such regulation would protect the public against
loss of life and property during future floods.197 Together, these three techniques
(and others) could serve to discourage communities from enacting the land-use
regulations required as a prerequisite to participating in the NFIP, or more likely,
to deter them from enacting standards safer than the bare floor set by that program.198 As a result, the takings doctrine thwarts the NFIP’s purposes of distributing burdens equitably between those in flood-prone areas and the general public,
and of relieving the federal government of a portion of the expense of flood control and disaster relief.199
1. First English—Challenging Floodplain Regulations
First English involved a church campground known as “Lutherglen” that
served as a retreat and recreational site for children with handicaps.200 Located
along the banks of a creek that flowed through a canyon, Lutherglen and the surrounding area undisputedly became a potential flood hazard after a forest fire
burned thousands of upstream acres.201 After a heavy rainstorm, the river flooded,
drowning ten people and causing millions of dollars in damage throughout the
canyon.202 The buildings on Lutherglen were destroyed.203 In response, Los

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
(1989).
202.
203.

See supra text accompanying note 186.
See infra text accompanying notes 209–16, 242–46.
See infra text accompanying notes 209–16.
See infra note 248.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.A.3.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 307 (1987).
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of L.A., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1356–57
Id. at 1357 (calling the flood “a disaster waiting to happen”).
Id.
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Angeles County adopted an interim ordinance prohibiting the construction or
reconstruction of structures in portions of the canyon deemed “interim flood protection area[s],” including most of Lutherglen.204 The Church, as owner of
Lutherglen, sued the County, alleging that the interim ordinance caused a temporary regulatory taking of its property for which compensation was required.205
The lower court struck the takings allegation and the California Court of Appeal
affirmed.206 Although the allegations in the complaint could be described as
“cryptic,”207 the Supreme Court framed the issue as one of remedy: Whether the
Fifth Amendment “require[s] compensation as a remedy for ‘temporary’ regulatory takings—those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by the
courts.”208
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, was eager to reach the remedial
question, even though the California courts had not determined whether a taking
had occurred under the facts of that case.209 The court was troubled by the
California Court of Appeal’s analysis, which it interpreted as restricting all takings claims to the remedy of nonmonetary relief.210 Confining its consideration to
the question of “whether the Just Compensation Clause requires the government
to pay for ‘temporary’ regulatory takings,”211 the court held in the affirmative,
holding that “invalidation of the ordinance without payment of fair value for the
use of the property during [the] period of time [the ordinance was in effect] would
be a constitutionally insufficient remedy.”212 The court assumed as true for the
purposes of its decision that the ordinance in fact denied the Church all use of its
property,213 but itself declined to address the underlying takings issue.214 In dissent, Justice Stevens chastised the majority for “unnecessarily and imprudently
assuming” the ordinance worked an unconstitutional taking, and therefore
unnecessarily reaching a novel constitutional issue.215 On remand, the California
204. First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
205. Id. at 308.
206. Id. at 311 (interpreting Agins v. Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 447
U.S. 255 (1980)).
207. Id. at 312–13 (rejecting appellee’s suggestion the allegations were “cryptic” and the complaint
inadequate).
208. Id. at 310.
209. Id. at 312–13 (noting earlier cases in which finality concerns rendered the Court’s consideration
of the remedial question premature).
210. Id. at 310 (discussing the California Court of Appeal’s reliance on Agins v. Tiburon, 598 P.2d
25 (Cal. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)). In dissent, Justice Stevens challenged as
incorrect the majority’s assumption that the California Supreme Court had in fact decided that state
courts could never grant monetary relief for temporary regulatory takings. Id. at 322–23.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. (“We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance at issue actually denied
appellant all use of its property.”).
215. Id. at 322–24 (complaining that the majority’s “lack of self-restraint is imprudent”) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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Court of Appeal held that the ordinance was not a regulatory taking after all
because it did not deny the Church “all use” of its property.216
Because the court assumed, rather than decided, that the ordinance denied the
Church all use of its property,217 its opinion was in tension with the traditional
presumption in favor of the validity of legislative enactments. Deeming the validity of the County’s interim ordinance “irrelevant,” the court emphasized the
unique posture of the case under which the constitutional question of remedy had
been isolated for the court’s consideration.218 In dissent, Justice Stevens challenged the majority’s failure to require the Church to allege that the County had
an improper purpose or insufficient justification for the interim ordinance, arguing that the presumption of validity is “particularly appropriate” in this case
because the Church did make any arguments in favor of the ordinance’s invalidity
or interference with any future uses of Lutherglen by the Church.219 Highlighting
the facts of the case, Justice Stevens concluded, “In light of the tragic flood and
the loss of life that precipitated the safety regulations here, it is hard to understand
how appellant ever expected to rebuild on Lutherglen.”220 On remand, the
California Court of Appeal echoed such concerns, asserting that “it would be
extraordinary to construe the Constitution to require a government to compensate
private landowners because it denied them ‘the right’ to use property which cannot be used without risking injury and death.”221 The Court of Appeal emphasized
that the County’s challenged zoning regulation involved the “highest of public
interests—the prevention of death and injury.”222 The court explained, “[the ordinance’s] enactment was prompted by the loss of life in an earlier flood. And its
avowed purpose is to prevent the loss of lives in future floods.”223 In contrast, the
Supreme Court’s majority opinion did not even mention that the flood precipitating the County’s interim ordinance had been deadly and costly.
Overall, First English has the potential to deter local governments from enacting the type of floodplain regulations contemplated by the National Flood

216. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of L.A., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1367–68
(1989). The California Court of Appeal derived the deprivation of the “all use” test from Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion in First English, which in turn relied in part on Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980) (“The application of a general zoning law to a particular property effects a taking if the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests [citation omitted] or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land [citation omitted].”). First English, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1364. The
Agins’ “all use” test was a precursor of the modern Court’s opinion in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (holding “regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use”
requires compensation unless “the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with”).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 213–14.
218. First English, 482 U.S. at 311–12.
219. Id. at 326–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. First English, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1366.
222. Id. at 1370.
223. Id.
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Insurance Act. Dissenting Justice Stevens warned that the Court’s decision would
have far-reaching implications: “Cautious local officials and land-use planners
may avoid taking any action that might later be challenged and thus give rise to a
damages action. Much important regulation will never be enacted, even perhaps
in the health and safety area.” 224 He criticized the majority opinion as a “loose
cannon . . . unattached to the Constitution” that would undoubtedly spark a “litigation explosion.”225
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, did not disagree. Quoting Armstrong v.
United States,226 he stated that it is “axiomatic” that the takings clause is
“designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”227 He acknowledged that the Court’s opinion “will undoubtedly lessen to
some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing
bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations.”228
However, he suggested that this was a fair result because the just compensation
clause of the Fifth Amendment was designed to limit such flexibility and freedom
in some cases; he quoted Justice Holmes’ statement that “a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”229 Thus, the
intended effect of First English was to shift the cost of flood safety from those
who occupy risky areas to government regulators who restrict such risk-taking.
First English’s chilling message lives on, despite the fact that no taking had
actually occurred, as found by the lower court on remand.230
2. Lucas—Challenging Coastal Regulations
Whereas First English addressed county land-use regulations designed to prevent harm from river flooding, Lucas involved a challenge to a state’s regulations
designed to protect life and property from coastal storms and hurricanes.231 South
Carolina had designed its challenged regulations to comply with the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972 (“CZMA”).232 Passed just four years after the
National Flood Insurance Act, the CZMA employs a scheme of cooperative federalism with the goal of “protecting natural resources, managing development in
high hazard areas, giving development priority to coastal-dependent uses, and

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

First English, 482 U.S. at 340–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
First English, 428 U.S. at 318–19.
Id. at 321.
Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
See supra text accompanying note 216.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1021 n.10 (1992).
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012).
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providing public access for recreation.”233 In 1986, the plaintiff/petitioner David
Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island near
Charleston, South Carolina. Lucas himself had also developed an extensive residential area on the island.234 In 1988, in compliance with the CZMA, South
Carolina passed a state Coastal Management Act that, among other things, prohibited the construction of habitable structures seaward of a setback line established by defendant/respondent South Carolina Coastal Council.235 The coastal
zone restriction prevented Lucas from building residences on either of his two
remaining lots (but he had been permitted to develop numerous other homes in
the development previously).236
Lucas sued, alleging that the state restriction worked a taking of his property
without just compensation.237 The Supreme Court applied the categorical rule
that compensation is required whenever regulation “denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land,”238—which has come to be known as the “wipeout” or “total takings” rule.239 Relying on the South Carolina trial court’s finding
that the construction ban rendered Lucas’ lots “valueless,”240 the Court held that
compensation was required unless, on remand, the state Coastal Council could
demonstrate that well-established principles of common law would have precluded Lucas’ contemplated development.241
As in First English, three aspects of the Court’s analysis could discourage
states and local governments from enacting flood protection regulations. First,
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion arguably addressed an issue that was not
squarely before the Court. He accepted as true the state trial court’s finding that
the development restriction rendered the two Lucas lots “valueless” and declined
233. In the words of Justice Blackmun, in dissent, “the Act was designed to provide States with
money and incentives to carry out Congress’ goal of protecting the public from shoreline erosion and
coastal hazards. In the 1980 amendments to the Act, Congress directed States to enhance their coastal
programs by “[p]reventing or significantly reducing threats to life and the destruction of property by
eliminating development and redevelopment in high-hazard areas.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (citing 16
U.S.C. § 1456b(a)(2)).
234. Id. at 1008.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1009.
238. Id. at 1015. Justice Scalia suggested that the rule he announced in Lucas was not new, but traced
back to a variety of sources including Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Dissenting Justice
Blackmun disagreed, repeatedly citing to the Court’s “new” rule. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054.
Some commentators also seem to share Justice Blackmun’s skepticism. See, e.g., Krier & Sterk, supra
note 189, at 59 (suggesting that Lucas articulated a new categorical rule “unless one takes seriously
Justice Scalia’s assertion that the rule had been in place at least since a sentence of dictum in Agins v.
City of Tiburon”).
239. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 189, at 42–43 (referring to the Lucas categorical rule as the
“wipeout” rule).
240. Id.
241. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (explaining that application of its categorical rule could be avoided if a
“logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with”).
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to consider the respondent’s argument that such finding was erroneous.242 The
concurring and dissenting justices questioned this approach, calling it “curious,”243 “implausible,”244 “premature,”245 and “improvident[]”.246
As a second analytical technique disfavoring government regulators, Lucas
cast doubt on the good faith of the South Carolina Coastal Council.247 Lucas conceded that the challenged regulation was “necessary to prevent a great public
harm.”248 However, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion suggested that South
Carolina had been disingenuous in asserting such a harm-prevention rationale
because regulations “requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state”
and without economically beneficial use carry “a heightened risk that private
property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.”249 Brushing off dissenting Justice Blackmun’s catalog of the known flood hazards of the area,250 Justice Scalia asserted, “[i]n Justice

242. Id. at 1029 n.9 (“This finding was the premise of the petition for certiorari, and since it was not
challenged in the brief in opposition we decline to entertain the argument in respondent’s brief on the
merits [citation omitted] that the finding was erroneous.”).
243. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I share the reservations of some of my colleagues about
a finding that a beach–front lot loses all value because of a development restriction. . . . Where a taking
is alleged from regulations which deprive the property of all value, the test must be whether the
deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment–backed expectations.”).
244. Id. at 1045 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting the majority imagines that regulation will
rarely prohibit all economic use of real estate and that it “[a]lmost certainly did not happen in this
case” and complaining of the Court’s altering the “long-settled rules of review” in its “haste to reach
a result”).
245. Id. at 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Proper application of the doctrine of judicial restraint
would avoid the premature adjudication of an important constitutional question.”).
246. Id. at 1076 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I would dismiss the writ of certiorari in this case as having
been granted improvidently. After briefing and argument it is abundantly clear that an unreviewable
assumption in which this case comes to us is both questionable as a conclusion of Fifth Amendment law
and sufficient to frustrate the Court’s ability to render certain the legal premises on which its holding
rests.”).
247. See generally Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and
Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 1168–71 (2007).
248. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1021 (“By neglecting to dispute the findings enumerated in the Act or
otherwise to challenge the legislature’s purposes, petitioner ‘concede[d] that the beach/dune area of
South Carolina’s shores is an extremely valuable public resource; that the erection of new
construction, inter alia, contributes to the erosion and destruction of this public resource; and that
discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a
great public harm.’”).
249. Id. at 1016.
250. Justice Blackmun complained,
The country has come to recognize that uncontrolled beachfront development can cause serious
damage to life and property. . . . Hurricane Hugo’s September 1989 attack upon South Carolina’s
coastline, for example, caused 29 deaths and approximately $6 billion in property damage, much
of it the result of uncontrolled beachfront development. . . . The beachfront buildings are not only
themselves destroyed in such a storm, “but they are often driven, like battering rams, into adjacent
inland homes” [citation omitted]. Moreover, the development often destroys the natural sand dune
barriers that provide storm breaks.

Id. at 1036 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Blackmun’s view, even with respect to regulations that deprive an owner of all
developmental or economically beneficial land-uses, the test for required compensation is whether the legislature has recited a harm-preventing justification for
its action.”251 He concluded, “[s]ince such a justification can be formulated in
practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff. We think the Takings Clause requires courts to do more than insist upon
artful harm-preventing characterizations.”252 In retrospect, the regulation’s harmpreventing characterization proved to be firmly rooted in reality, rather than the
artistry suggested by Justice Scalia. The same 2017 hurricane season that ravaged
Houston posed grave threats to the Isle of Palms, home to David Lucas’ development.253 Even before, the area has long struggled with persistent storm tides that
threatened the island’s homes and amenities.254
In sum, Lucas has almost certainly chilled flood protections of the type that are
critical to the success of the NFIP. As Justice Stevens argued in dissent, the
majority’s new categorical rule would impose substantial costs on state and local
governments and was therefore “likely to impede the development of sound landuse policy.”255 With millions of dollars at stake, land-use officials would face
both “substantial uncertainty because of the ad hoc nature of takings law and
unacceptable penalties if they guess incorrectly about that law.”256 In effect,
Justice Stevens continued, Lucas establishes “a form of insurance” against the
modification of land-use regulations.257 Similar to other forms of insurance, he
concluded, “the Court’s rule creates a ‘moral hazard’ and inefficiencies: In the
face of uncertainty about changes in the law, developers will overinvest, safe in

Justice Blackmun also observed,
The area is notoriously unstable. In roughly half of the last 40 years, all or part of petitioner’s property was part of the beach or flooded twice daily by the ebb and flow of the tide. . . . Tr. 84.
Between 1957 and 1963, petitioner’s property was under water. . . . Between 1963 and 1973 the
shoreline was 100 to 150 feet onto petitioner’s property. . . . In 1973 the first line of stable vegetation was about halfway through the property. . . . Between 1981 and 1983, the Isle of Palms issued
12 emergency orders for sandbagging to protect property in the Wild Dune development. . . .
Determining that local habitable structures were in imminent danger of collapse, the Council
issued permits for two rock revetments to protect condominium developments near petitioner’s
property from erosion; one of the revetments extends more than halfway onto one of his lots.

Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 1024 n.11.
252. Id.
253. Mayci McLeod, Isle of Palms Working to Rebuild After Irma, NEWS2 (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.
counton2.com/news/isle-of-palms-working-to-rebuild-after-irma_20180228082028309/997630821.
254. Bo Petersen, South Carolina Regulators Allow Temporary Sea Walls to Remain on Isle of Palms
Beaches, POST & COURIER (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/south-carolina-regulatorsallow-temporary-sea-walls-to-remain-on/article_4750460e-04fe-11e7-87c3-13fffa1f397e.html (describing
experimental use since 2013 of removable sea walls to protect millions of dollars’ worth of beachfront
property from coastal storms and erosion).
255. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1070 n.5, 1071 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1070 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the knowledge that if the law changes adversely, they will be entitled to compensation.”258 Thus, similar to First English, Lucas was intended to shift the costs of
floodplain safety from landowners to state and local regulators.
B.

THE MECHANISM: CHALLENGING GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND ACTIVITY

Sorting through the classifications of Fifth Amendment “takings” can be daunting. The most straightforward application involves exercises of eminent domain,
under which a governmental authority “condemns” and takes title to private property for “public use”259 in exchange for the payment of just compensation. The
quintessential example of eminent domain would be the case where a state or the
federal government condemns numerous private strips of land (and pays compensation) along a highway to widen it. Such condemnations have sometimes been
called “explicit takings.”260 In contrast, courts have found that other types of governmental actions that impact private property constitute “takings,” even though
the actions stop short of transferring title from private owner to governmental entity. Some commentators refer to these as “implicit takings”261 to distinguish
them from exercises of eminent domain. This section discusses the impact on
national flood protection policy of two types of “implicit takings” under the Fifth
Amendment—regulatory takings262 and physical takings.263
1. Regulatory Takings—Challenging Floodplain Regulation
When federal, state, or local officials adopt regulations that “go too far” in their
impact on private property, such regulation can be deemed a taking that requires
compensation of the affected property owner.264 The type of state and local regulations required of communities participating in the NFIP would potentially fall
into this category of implicit takings.265 Most challenged floodplain regulations
would be evaluated under the test established in Penn Central Transportation Co.

258. Id.
259. “Public use” is a well-litigated and controversial term of art, which has been interpreted broadly
enough to encompass “public purposes” such as urban renewal and economic revitalization, even if the
public does not physically “use” the condemned property. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469 (2005), reh’g denied, 545 U.S. 1158 (2005); see generally CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, PROPERTY:
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND SKILLS 688–708 (2016).
260. See, e.g., Krier & Sterk, supra note 189, at 40.
261. See, e.g., id.; Sandra B. Zellmer, Takings, Torts, and Background Principles, 52 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 193, 204 (2017) (“‘Implicit takings’ includes inverse condemnation by regulation and takings
by invasion or occupation, where the government did not intend to take title but effectively did so by its
actions.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1637
(2015).
262. See infra Part III.B.1.
263. See infra Part III.B.2.
264. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (asserting the general rule that “while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”).
265. See infra Part I.B.2.
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v. New York City.266 Under Penn Central, courts engage in ad hoc factual inquiries, with factors of “particular significance” including, (1) “the economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant,” (2) “the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) the “character
of the government action.”267 With respect to the third factor, Penn Central
explained that a taking “may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”268 That language seems
well-suited to support land-use regulations enacted in compliance with NFIP
against regulatory takings challenges.
The Supreme Court subsequently reinforced this suggestion in Murr v.
Wisconsin in 2017. Plaintiffs alleged that a lot merger ordinance preventing them
from separately using or selling two adjacent lots that they owned constituted an
uncompensated taking.269 The lots were located along the St. Croix River, which
has been designated a “wild and scenic river” entitled to protection under a federal law that takes a cooperative federalism approach.270 In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim, the Court discussed application of the third Penn Central factor to
river areas, explaining “the governmental action was a reasonable land-use regulation, enacted as part of a coordinated federal, state, and local effort to preserve
the river and surrounding land”271—language that arguably supports local floodplain ordinances enabling a community to participate in the NFIP.272
The NFIP itself was the subject of a facial challenge in Texas Landowners
Rights Association v. Harris, a case decided in 1978 less than one month before

266. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
267. Id. at 124 (internal citation omitted).
268. Id. (internal citation omitted).
269. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). Murr was a 5–3 decision (with Justice Gorsuch
taking no part in the consideration or decision of the case).
270. Id. at 1940 (citing to the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1274 (1972), and
noting that “[t]ourists and residents of the region have long extolled the picturesque grandeur of the river
and surrounding area”). Like the NFIP, the legislation requires a cooperative approach between federal
and state governments. Id. (explaining roles of the federal government and the states of Wisconsin and
Minnesota).
271. Id. at 1949–50.
272. See supra notes 52–53, 95–98 and accompanying text. The Murr Court also articulated three
factors that seem to apply to the second Penn Central factor related to the landowner’s distinct,
investment-backed expectations. See supra notes 266–67 and accompanying text. Of import to the
NFIP, the Court stated “it may be relevant that the property is located in an area that is subject to, or
likely to become subject to, environmental or other regulation.” Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 194–46 (quoting
Justice Kennedy’s Lucas concurrence, “Coastal property may present such unique concerns for a fragile
land system that the State can go further in regulating its development and use than the common law of
nuisance might otherwise permit”); see generally John Echeverria, Big Victory for State and Local
Governments in Murr, TAKINGS LITIGATION: A BLOG ABOUT TAKINGS LAW (June 26, 2017), https://
takingslitigation.com/2017/06/26/big–victory–for–state–and–local–governments–in–murr/.
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the Supreme Court decided Penn Central.273 The District Court for the District of
Columbia rejected a challenge by Texas, political subdivisions in twelve states,
and landowners that the NFIP’s “carrot and stick” scheme worked a regulatory
taking of their floodplain property because it denied nonparticipating communities certain federal financial assistance and federally-related financing by private
lenders for the purchase or construction of property.274 The plaintiffs did not
allege that the statutory scheme rendered their property useless or valueless, and
therefore a Lucas-like analysis was inapplicable.275 Instead, the district court
decided the case under a loose balancing test that can be seen as a precursor to the
Penn Central analysis. In particular, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that
sanctions applied under the NFIP for the failure of individuals or communities to
participate in the program worked an unacceptable “diminution in property
value” that triggered a compensation requirement.276 As the court explained, the
case “turns upon the usual balancing test of social policy and public interest versus the rights of a landowner to be unencumbered in the use of his property.”277
The court found that the NFIP promoted a legitimate national goal to “equitably
spread the costs of flood disasters among those landowners who most benefit
from publicly funded flood disaster relief.”278 It concluded that the NFIP does not
constitute a taking without compensation and that the “scales tip” in favor of the
important public safety, health, and welfare goals of the program.279
At first blush, cases such as Penn Central, Murr v. Wisconsin, and Texas
Landowners Rights Association would seem to give comfort to local officials considering the adoption of floodplain regulations. And yet, the Supreme Court took
great pains in First English and Lucas to design two specialized tests more favorable to landowners than the default Penn Central test.280 Government regulators
know that they tread a fine line between constitutionality and unconstitutionality
whenever they venture into the realm of land-use regulation. If regulators guess
incorrectly about the state of the law (as noted by Justice Stevens in his Lucas dissent),281 they face penalties potentially beyond their economic reach.

273. Texas Landowners Rights Ass’n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d, 598 F.2d
311 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979). The Texas Landowners district court opinion
was handed down on May 31, 1978, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its Penn Central
opinion on June 26, 1978.
274. Id. at 1027–28, 1030.
275. Id. at 1032. As Justice Scalia asserted, the Lucas rule found its roots in Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980), making a Lucas-type analysis possible before the actual Lucas decision of 1992.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–18 (1992).
276. Texas Landowners, 453 F. Supp. at 1031.
277. Id. at 1032.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See supra Part III.B.1.
281. See supra text accompanying note 256.
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2. Physical Takings—Challenging the Operation of Federal Flood Control
Structures
The NFIP is but one support in the three-legged stool—federal flood control
structures, federal disaster relief, and federal flood insurance—built by Congress
to keep the nation safe from floods.282 As explained in the previous section, the
regulatory takings doctrine takes direct aim at the land-use regulations essential
to the proper functioning of the flood insurance program. This theory was
successfully employed in the Houston area, for example, to deter the city from
regulating certain development restrictions within floodways.283 In contrast, as
this section will discuss, the physical takings doctrine attacks the first leg of the
stool—federal flood control structures such as reservoirs, dams, and levees. This
doctrine figures prominently in the pending class action lawsuits brought after
Hurricane Harvey. In those cases, the plaintiffs claim that the federal government’s failure to contain the deluge of floodwaters in the Addicks and Barker
Reservoirs created a taking of their land for which compensation is required.284
The stakes are huge. The post-Harvey class action cases, for example, involve up
to 20,000 plaintiffs and could subject the federal government and taxpayers to an
estimated three billion dollars in damages.285 Despite its potential impact, the
physical takings doctrine is in flux as courts struggle to determine whether government flooding of private land should sound in takings or in tort.286 The postHarvey litigation has the potential to provide much-needed clarity or to take a
wrong turn in the development of legal doctrine.287
Two modern cases are particularly relevant. The Supreme Court first sets the
stage for physical takings claims in its 2012 opinion, Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission v. United States.288 In that case, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
periodically released water from a federal dam.289 To benefit downstream farmers, the Corps deviated from its usual rates of release as specified in the Corps’
own water control manual.290 The petitioner, Arkansas Game and Fish
Commission, alleged that the modified releases flooded its downstream forest
lands, damaged or destroyed its timber crop, and disrupted the Commission’s use
and enjoyment of its property.291 As framed before the Supreme Court, the issue
282. See supra Part I.A.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 155–57.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 170–71; see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the federal
government’s first venture into flood control through the construction of levees and other structures).
285. Jack Witthaus, Houston Law Firms Named to Consolidated Harvey Flood Cases, HOUS. BUS. J.
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2017/11/21/houston–law–firms–named–
to–consolidated–harvey.html.
286. See generally, Zellmer, supra note 261, at 193.
287. See Echeverria, supra note 272.
288. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012).
289. Id. at 28.
290. Id. at 27–28.
291. Id. at 26.
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was quite narrow, asking “whether temporary flooding can ever give rise to a
[physical] takings claim.”292 Citing First English293 and other cases, the Court
concluded, “[n]o decision of this Court authorizes a blanket temporary-flooding
exception to our Takings Clause jurisprudence, and we decline to create such an
exception in this case.”294
Going beyond that narrow holding, the Court then proceeded to discuss how
the case might be resolved under Penn Central and its situation-specific, factual
inquiries.295 In this case, particularly relevant inquiries would include, according
to the Court, (1) the duration of the temporary flooding, (2) “the degree to
which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized government action,” (3) the landowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations,
taking into consideration the character of the land as a floodplain below a dam,
and (4) the severity of the interference with the land’s use.296 On remand, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims that the
flooding constituted a compensable temporary taking.297 Its discussion further
blurred the distinction between tort and takings law.298
Five years after it decided Arkansas Game & Fish on remand, the Federal
Circuit decided another flood-related takings case that spanned the tort/takings
divide. This time, it employed a broader analysis more favorable to government
actors. In its 2018 decision, St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States,299
the Federal Circuit likely brought an end to long-running litigation dating back to
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The court considered whether the increased flooding
from a navigation channel known as the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet that
292. Id. at 32.
293. First English is discussed supra Part III.A.1.
294. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 568 U.S. at 34.
295. Id. at 31–32.
296. Id. at 38–40. Scholars have found the Court’s discussion ambiguous. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Is
Federal Government Flooding of Houston Homes a Taking?, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/10/31/is-federal-government-flooding-of-houstonhomes-a-taking/ (asserting “the Court’s decision was far from a model of clarity when it comes to the
question of how to figure out whether a given case of deliberate temporary flooding should be
considered a taking or not”); see generally Robert Haskell Abrams & Jacqueline Bertelsen,
Downstream Inundations Caused by Federal Flood Control Dam Operations in a Changing Climate:
Getting the Proper Mix of Takings, Tort, and Compensation, 19 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 11 (2015)
(observing that Arkansas Game & Fish will encourage litigation by flood-affected landowners).
297. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
298. Id.; see Zellmer, supra note 261, at 193 (arguing that the case and its progeny “produce a
chilling effect, making officials less likely to restrict improvident floodplain and coastal development for
fear of takings claims” and may also “inhibit governments’ willingness to . . . construct, retrofit, or
operate dams, levees, and other types of flood control structures for any purpose other than flood control,
such as environmental quality, recreation, or wildlife habitat”). Zellmer also argues “the vast majority of
cases involving temporary physical occupations by flooding are torts, not takings, and those that are
characterized as takings may only be successful if a reasonable investment-backed expectation in a
lawful activity or development is adversely affected such that the landowner has experienced greater
losses than gains at the hands of the government.” Zellmer, supra note 261, at 195.
299. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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channeled storm surge directly into New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina constituted a temporary taking under Arkansas Game & Fish. The Federal Circuit
found no taking because the plaintiffs failed to consider all government action as
a whole—including the construction of a series of protective levees.300 Under this
so-called “net benefits” test,301 the government’s actions, taken together, likely
placed the plaintiffs in a better position than if the government had taken no
action at all.302 In addition, the court made clear that allegations of government
inaction were insufficient to support a takings claim: “While the theory that the
government failed to maintain or modify a government-constructed project may
state a tort claim, it does not state a takings claim. A property loss compensable
as a taking only results when the asserted invasion is the direct, natural, or probable result of authorized government action.”303
As suggested above, the regulatory takings doctrine seeks to shift the costs of
flood safety from floodplain occupants to government regulators.304 A robust
physical takings doctrine could bring about a similar result: If plaintiffs can circumvent tort immunity by instead bringing a physical takings claim, then they, in
effect, make the federal government an insurer of their safety, without undertaking the necessary development sacrifices envisioned by the NFIP. The two doctrines combined could place government officials in an untenable bind: If state or
local governments regulate risky development, they may subject themselves to
ruinous regulatory takings liability. But if they allow risky development to go forward, then the federal government may be subject to enormous liability for the
maintenance of flood control structures, the payment of disaster relief and flood
insurance benefits, and the payment of physical takings claims if the federal government’s infrastructure is unable to successfully contain excess floodwaters. In
the wake of storms and hurricanes, floodwaters must go somewhere, but who
should bear the cost of the damage they inflict?
C.

LOOKING BACK: UNDERMINING FEDERAL FLOOD PROTECTION

The takings doctrine undermines federal flood protection in subtle ways. As
discussed below, the regulatory takings doctrine can deter regulation essential to
300. Id. at 1363.
301. See generally Edward P. Richards, A Radical Proposal: Does St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United
States Allow the Federal Government to Step Away from Flood Protection and Create Wild Seashores
and Wild Rivers, VT. ENVTL. F. 11 (2018) available at https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blog/Richards-NetBenefits-Analysis-in-Takings-Cases-The-St-Bernard-Flooding-Case.pdf.
302. Id.
303. St. Bernard Par., 887 F.3d at 1354, 1360. The plaintiffs filed an action in tort based on the same
facts. In 2012, the Fifth Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs’ torts claims, holding that the federal
government was immune under the Flood Control Act (claims related to levee breaches) and under the
discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (claims related to dredging of
navigation canal and other claims). In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436, 446 (5th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 570 U.S. 926 (2013).
304. See supra Part III.A.
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the NFIP’s success. The physical takings doctrine, in turn, serves to shift the cost
of risky development onto the federal government and federal taxpayers.
1. Liability and Deterrence
Based on the Supreme Court’s reluctance to defer to government regulators, as
articulated in First English and Lucas,305 one would expect that NFIP-related
land-use regulations routinely would be declared unconstitutional. Early commentary in the wake of the NFIP’s 1968 enactment feared just such a result, worrying that the takings doctrine would “effectively kill” the NFIP.306 Although
those fears may have been overblown, this section will discuss how the takings
doctrine proved a powerful opponent to federal flood protection through liability
and deterrence.
First, the takings doctrine can undermine federal flood protection by imposing
potentially ruinous costs on communities that enact land-use regulation. When
communities lose a takings challenge, the consequences can be devastating. A
cautionary tale—no doubt well-known among local officials—involves the
thirty-six million dollar judgment against Half Moon Bay, California, a small
municipality with a population of only 12,000.307 In the face of such staggering
liability, Half Moon Bay suspended its police department and recreation services,
and even considered dissolution of the municipality itself.308 But takings claimants do not have to prevail in court to subject regulators to financial losses. The
cost of mounting a takings defense can be quite high, even if the defense successfully wards off liability on the underlying claims.309
Second, the mere threat of takings litigation can deter regulators from enacting
land-use restrictions.310 This phenomenon of regulatory chill persists, despite the
fact that takings claims are remarkably unsuccessful. Professors James Krier and
Stewart Sterk developed an extensive empirical database designed to test the
305. Id.
306. See generally Saul Jay Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National Flood Insurance
Program and the “Takings” Clause, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 323, 323 (1990) (expressing concern
that a judicial finding that floodplain regulations “constitute ‘takings,’ thereby invoking the fifth
amendment requirement that the government tender ‘just compensation,’ would effectively kill the
NFIP”); Zygmunt J. B. Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power,
52 TEX. L. REV. 201, 223 (1974) (discussing a “variety of constitutional onslaughts directed at
floodplain regulations”).
307. Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
308. Christopher Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 75, 77 (2016) (noting the high
litigation costs of defending takings claims even if the local government ultimately prevails). Serkin
noted the conventional wisdom that “successful regulatory takings claims are vanishingly rare” but
argued nevertheless that the “problem of uninsured risk of regulatory takings may lead to
underregulation and may also have distributional consequences between local governments.” Id. at 110.
309. Id. at 77 (adding happy postscript, from Half Moon Bay’s perspective, that the “municipality
was saved, however, when it successfully sued a former insurer for coverage under an ‘occurrencebased’ policy that had lapsed more than twenty years earlier”).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 151–53 (discussing the example of Houston).
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operation of takings doctrine “on the ground” outside the Supreme Court.311
Their database encompasses more than 2,000 implicit takings cases decided by
state and lower federal courts between 1979 and 2012.312 Overall, Krier and Sterk
found that landowners succeeded in fewer than 10% of all regulatory takings
cases.313 That figure may be even lower for cases aimed specifically at floodplain
restrictions. Takings scholar John Echeverria found an “apparently unbroken
string of precedent from around the country holding that floodplain development
restrictions do not represent [regulatory] takings.”314 With respect to physical (as
opposed to regulatory) takings involving flooding, Krier and Sterk tallied a reasonably high success rate, with landowners prevailing at a rate of about 33%.315
Despite high landowner losses, there may be a strategic advantage in continuing to prosecute takings lawsuits: Opponents of regulation may seek to deter
what they refer to as “overregulation.” Krier and Sterk pondered whether “the
prospect of litigation serve[s] to deter overregulation even when, in fact, the
litigation is likely to be unsuccessful[.]”316 They concluded in the affirmative,
positing that the Supreme Court’s forceful takings language—even if not determinative in a particular case—could have an on-the-ground effect on local officials’ decisions whether to enact regulation. Krier and Sterk asked why lawyers
“persist in litigating [regulatory takings] cases to judicial decision when the prospect of success is so low.”317 One potential response, they suggested, is that
developers have an incentive to bring low-probability claims because “reputation
as a litigious developer may increase the likelihood that a litigation-averse municipal entity will make concessions on future development applications.”318
Litigants, too, acknowledge the strategy of lawsuit as a deterrent. In First
English, the plaintiff Church’s brief challenged the view that the takings doctrine
chills regulation, but nevertheless cheered such a potential result: “One might
even be so bold as to suggest that ‘chilling’ unconstitutional conduct is a good

311. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 189, at 95.
312. Id. at 39. Krier and Sterk chose January 1979 as the starting date because they considered Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), decided the year before, as the “first
of the modern takings cases.” Id. at 52 (emphasis in original). They selected 2012 as the ending date of
their survey because the monthly reporting service they relied upon, Just Compensation, ceased
publication in June 2012. Id.
313. Id. at 64. Krier and Sterk noted that the actual success rate may have been even lower because
they had aggregated the results of all of their cases, which did not account for subsequent reversals on
appeal. Id.
314. John Echeverria, Floodplain Regulation Not a Taking in South Carolina, TAKINGS LITIG. (Aug. 13,
2015), https://takingslitigation.com/2015/08/13/floodplain-regulation-not-a-taking-in-south-carolina/; see
generally John Echeverria, TAKINGS LITIGATION: A BLOG ABOUT TAKINGS LAW, https://takingslitigation.
com/author/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
315. Krier & Sterk, supra note 189, at 58 (Table 2).
316. Id. at 95 (asking whether “the prospect of litigation serve[s] to deter overregulation even when,
in fact, the litigation is likely to be unsuccessful?”).
317. Id. at 64.
318. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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idea. Indeed, it is the hallmark of the Bill of Rights.”319 Beyond commentators
and litigators, Supreme Court justices have also flagged the potential deterrent
effect of the takings doctrine. In both his First English and Lucas dissents, Justice
Stevens complained, “[c]autious local officials and land-use planners may avoid
taking any action that might later be challenged and thus give rise to a damages
action. Much important regulation will never be enacted, even perhaps in the
health and safety area.”320
State and local officials may be reluctant to regulate land-use for many reasons
apart from the takings doctrine, such as a desire to maintain the community’s tax
base by approving as much development as possible. Still, the potential of the takings doctrine to discourage flood hazard regulation is sufficiently robust to merit
the exploration of counter-incentives to bolster the NFIP’s inducements for local
floodplain regulation.
2. The Government as Insurer of Risky Development
The regulatory takings doctrine allows landowners to externalize (or “upshift”)
the costs of risky development. If floodplain landowners are not allowed to build
because of local land-use regulations that comply with (or go beyond) the minimum standards of the NFIP, they may seek compensation from government regulators. Even if unsuccessful, landowners (particularly repeat players such as
developers, builders’ associations, and property rights groups) may be able to
enjoy relaxed regulation in the future due to the deterrent effect of the costs or
threatened costs of litigation defense.321 In this way, the regulatory takings doctrine can undermine the design of the NFIP.
Likewise, the physical takings doctrine can thwart important flood safety
measures. The federal government’s historical willingness to tackle flood
control (rather than leave it to local self-help measures) was based on a delicate balance: Although the federal government could do much to engineer
and insure against floods ex ante, and to provide disaster relief ex post when
flooding inevitably occurred despite the federal government’s efforts, it
insisted on caps on the government’s liability for undertaking such efforts
through tort immunity when flood control efforts failed;322 through limits on
the purposes and amounts of disaster relief;323 and through the NFIP’s quid
pro quo of local land-use regulations to minimize flood exposure.324 If plaintiffs can circumvent tort immunity by instead bringing a physical takings

319. Brief for Appellant, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of L.A., 482
U.S. 304 (1986), 1986 WL 727409, at 38 n.47.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 227–23.
321. See supra text accompanying note 316.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 26–29.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 40–42.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 96–98.
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claim—thereby blurring the tort/takings distinction325—then they in effect make
the federal government an insurer of their safety, without undertaking the necessary development sacrifices envisioned by the NFIP. As one commentator worried, takings cases might become “a kind of social insurance program” for
development risks, including those associated with climate change, at least for
those victims “fortunate enough to be able to point to a deep-pocketed defendant
like the United States.”326 Moreover, such lawsuits “may actually impede initiative to take steps to avoid the worst effects of climate change, undermining our
collective ability to build more resilient communities.”327
IV. THE WAY FORWARD
The NFIP offers communities powerful incentives to regulate hazard-prone
floodplain and coastal development. But in light of actual or threatened regulatory takings litigation, the NFIP’s incentives may not be powerful enough. Even
if communities do satisfy the NFIP’s bare regulatory minimum, they may be
afraid to go further to ensure an adequate margin of safety, as by limiting unwise
development outside the 1%-chance floodplain used by FEMA as the basis for its
often-outdated federal insurance rate maps. At the same time, application of the
physical takings doctrine to temporary or permanent flooding can cast the federal
government as an insurer of development, wherever located. Together, the two
doctrines can prod communities to under-regulate risky land-use while seeking to
hold the federal government responsible for the failure to provide near-perfect
flood control. As a result, federal taxpayers bear the burden of development in
known flood areas—precisely the result Congress designed the NFIP to avoid.
This Part considers reforms to both the NFIP and the takings doctrine that can
simultaneously protect human life and property, as well as the government’s
purse. These measures could help to realize the original goals of the NFIP which
might be paraphrased as—borrowing from the language Armstrong v. United
States—“to bar private landowners and developers from forcing the public alone
from bearing private burdens—which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by those who choose to undertake risky development.”328
A.

FLOOD INSURANCE: BACK TO BASICS

The path forward calls for a return to the first principles articulated in the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968—providing only temporary subsidies,
ensuring enactment of sound land-use regulation, encouraging partial retreat, and
advancing social equity. A February 2018 Public Opinion poll shows strong
325. See supra Part III.B.2.
326. John Echeverria & Robert Meltz, The Flood of Takings Cases After Hurricane Harvey,
CPRBLOG (Oct. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/6FRM-TUDP (emphasis added).
327. Id.
328. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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public support across political parties for policies that more fairly allocate the
costs of flood insurance and emphasize prevention rather than just recovery by
incorporating sensible mitigation measures.329
1. Phase Out Federal Subsidies
An important concern of the 1968 legislators was to “encourage persons to
become aware of the risk of occupying the flood plains.”330 Appropriate pricing
of flood insurance is a critical way of accomplishing this goal. The BiggertWaters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 tried to phase out subsidies rapidly
but was met with a severe political backlash by those who feared their insurance
rates would escalate rapidly. The subsequent Homeowner Flood Insurance
Affordability Act of 2014 also included a phase-out of subsidies, albeit on a more
gradual schedule. Importantly, the 2014 legislation also called for measures to
enhance affordability, hearkening back to an original component of the flood insurance program.331
In some cases, those with financial means are able to remain in the floodplain
and to elevate their structures so as to qualify for federal flood insurance, or to
buy property without a federally-backed mortgage and therefore to escape the
need for federal flood insurance. Care needs to be taken in subsidizing insurance
policies—even for the poor—because they may only work to keep people in the
path of danger. Premium support must be coupled with steps that reduce the risk
to vulnerable populations.332
2. Reinvigorate State and Local Land-Use Regulation
It is time to live up to one of Congress’ original purposes in enacting the flood
insurance program: to encourage strong, state and local land-use regulation. This
may require action at the federal, state, and local levels, and by the judicial as
well as legislative branches.
Congress should review and strengthen the incentives for local governments to
adopt tough limits on new development in floodplains and areas subject to flooding in extreme events. In April 2018, Houston adopted building standards which,
according to one report, “could have spared 84 percent of the buildings flooded
by Hurricane Harvey.”333 The standards increased the elevation required for new
buildings from one foot to two feet of elevation above the 0.2%-chance
329. See Bill McInturff & Lori Weigel, Survey Findings on Flooding and Related Policies, PUBLIC
OPINION STRATEGIES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/9T7Z-WDS2.
330. H.R. Rep. No. 90-1585, at 2966–67.
331. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 23.
332. See Flavelle, supra note 138.
333. Scott Wilson, Fresh from Hurricane Harvey’s Flooding: Houston Starts to Build Anew—In the
Floodplain, WASH. POST (May 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fresh-from-hurricaneharveys-flooding-houston-starts-to-build-anew–in-the-flood-plain/2018/05/22/2c5ccab8-53b6-11e8-a5515b648abe29ef_story.html?utm_term=.a5dc0dd23f44.
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floodplain. Through regulation, FEMA could enact a similarly-protective standard as the baseline for communities that want to make federal flood insurance
available to their residents. Congress should also strengthen the requirements of
the NFIP to insist that flood maps on which the federal insurance program, local
communities, and residents rely are updated to reflect the true risk presented in an
era of climate change.
3. Encourage Partial Floodplain Retreat
Beyond phasing out subsidies for insurance premiums, it is important to encourage the removal of more buildings from the floodplain altogether through
voluntary buyout programs. This would help to solve the well-documented “repetitive loss” problem, under which a small number of high-risk properties take
up a disproportionately large proportion of insurance payouts. Section 1323 of
the National Flood Insurance Act, added in 2004, provides a repetitive flood
claims grant program to mitigate structures, which includes acquisition or relocation of at-risk structures.334 Even before the most recent rounds of hurricanes, for
example, Harris County, Texas bought out more than 3,000 flood-prone properties between 1985 and 2015, using federal and local loans and funds. This
amounted to a purchase of more than 1,000 acres that were restored as natural
floodplains; the county estimated that this saved at least 1,500 homes from flooding during one storm alone (the so-called “Tax Day Flood” in April 2015).335
This program could be expanded, perhaps partially funded through premium
increases over time, emphasizing buyouts and retreats over the partial solution
represented by vertical retreat through the elevation of structures or the filling
and raising of lot elevations.336
4. Provide Better Signaling
There are many sources that document the inaccuracy of FEMA’s floodplain
maps, how they fail to take advantage of the best available data, and how they fail
to take into account the reality of climate change.337 In Houston, for example,
many homeowners did not realize they were within identified “flood pools”
334. Repetitive Flood Claims Grant Program Fact Sheet, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (March
2, 2018 9:30 AM), https://perma.cc/B9LY-FL45.
335. Mitigation Best Practices: Buyouts a Win–Win for Harris County and Residents, FED.
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/Y3MG-A6D2 (last visited Dec. 17, 2018); see also Zack
Colman, Disaster Prep Saves More Money Than Previously Thought, E&E NEWS (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/01/19/stories/1060071409.
336. Some propose phasing out federal insurance policies for new construction in the floodplain. The
Trump Administration, for example, has called for rendering newly built houses in the floodplain
ineligible for federal flood insurance by 2021. Mary Williams Walsh, A Broke, and Broken, Flood
Insurance Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2017, at A1.
337. Jen Schwartz, National Flood Insurance Is Underwater Because of Outdated Science, SCI. AM.
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/national-flood-insurance-is-underwaterbecause-of-outdated-science/.
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where stored floodwaters could be released periodically. This represents a failure
of signaling as well as an abdication of responsibility by local government by
allowing homes to be built within the known flood pool.338
Requiring disclosure of a property’s location within a flood zone, as some
states require, is only meaningful if the flood zones reflect risk accurately. Sellers
may already be required to disclose past flooding under state statutory common
law standards, but this can be difficult and costly for a misled buyer to enforce.
State legislatures should update their disclosure statutes to account for this.
5. Enhance Equity
Since its enactment, the NFIP has included a focus on supporting the most vulnerable in our communities. Reforms of all aspects of the NFIP should incorporate need-based distinctions and provide relief to those who need it most. With
the growing deficit in the NFIP and the prospect of more extreme storms, subsidizing those with adequate resources may not be a sustainable strategy. In addition, greater transparency by FEMA in reporting the types of assistance provided,
income levels of those receiving assistance, and overall cost could help ensure
that support is directed where it is needed.339
B.

FLOOD TAKINGS: INTERNALIZING EXTERNALITIES

The takings doctrine has had a perverse impact on the National Flood
Insurance Program. Nevertheless, various measures can help minimize that
impact. This section considers first the regulatory takings doctrine and then the
physical takings doctrine.
1. Regulatory Takings
Educating local regulators, developing a litigation strategy, and educating
landowners could help ensure that the regulatory takings doctrine does not deter
local regulators from enacting robust floodplain regulations in the name of public
safety.
Educate local regulators: Whenever possible, local regulators should be
made aware of the relatively low risk (about 10%) that regulatory takings challenges will be successful so that they will enact critical floodplain development

338. ZEHL & ASSOCS., supra note 160 (Houston law firm website asserting “The government may be
liable if your home or business was flooded due to the Addicks & Barker Reservoirs” and offering free
consultations).
339. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, THE WATERMARK (NFIP FINANCIAL STATEMENTS)
(2018), available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/161889 (described as a
“quarterly report that provides transparency on the financial state of the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP). The goal is to give interested stakeholders one central location to secure answers to
reoccurring questions pertaining to the NFIP.”).
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regulations with confidence.340 Making this relatively low risk known to community residents could also discourage regulators from using the threat of takings
lawsuits as a pretense to mask their desire to prop up tax revenues, sometimes at
the expense of public safety. Regulators could take advantage of resources provided by the Association of State Floodplain Managers, including explanations of
how to use the “no adverse impact” approach to enact floodplain regulations that
are both fair and likely to withstand legal challenge.341 To defray the costs of
defending against even an unsuccessful takings lawsuit, creative approaches such
as takings insurance should be explored.342
The Association of State Floodplain Managers343 has developed a floodplain
management policy it calls “no adverse impact.”344 The Association’s central
message is that “we are continuing to induce flood damage even while enforcing
the minimum standards of the NFIP,” which were designed as part of an insurance program and “not necessarily to control escalating flooding.”345 The NFIP
standards essentially call for a vertical retreat from the floodplain, by elevating
structures or the floodplain itself by filling it with dirt, but they do not provide a
comprehensive approach for safely accommodating floodwaters. As the
Association explains, current standards allow dangerous floodplain practices.
Among other things, they allow development activity
to divert flood waters onto other properties; to reduce the size of natural channel and overbank conveyance areas; to fill essential valley storage space; and
to alter water velocities—all with little or no regard for how these changes
affect other people and property in the floodplain or elsewhere in the watershed. The net result is that our own actions are intensifying the potential for
flood damage.346

Overall, the Association concludes,
a system has developed through which local and individual accountability has
been supplanted by federal programs . . . . The result is that the burden of

340. See supra text accompanying note 313.
341. See, e.g., No Adverse Impact Legal Issues, ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, http://
www.floods.org/index.asp?menuID=352&firstlevelmenuID=187&siteID=1 (last visited July 28, 2018).
342. See Serkin, supra note 308.
343. The ASFPM strives to be “a respected voice in floodplain management practice and policy in
the United States because it represents flood hazard specialists of local, state and federal government,
research community, insurance industry and the fields of engineering, hydrologic forecasting,
emergency response, water resources and others.” About ASFPM, ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN
MANAGERS, https://perma.cc/M7SX-DKP6 (last visited July 28, 2018). Its mission is “to promote
education, policies and activities that mitigate current and future losses, costs and human suffering
caused by flooding, and to protect the natural and beneficial functions of floodplains—all without
causing adverse impacts.” Id.
344. NAI—No Adverse Impact Floodplain Management, ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS
(Mar. 10, 2008), https://perma.cc/V38J-AW73.
345. Id.
346. Id.
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[floodplain development]—increased flood damage and flood disasters—is
transferred from those who make (and benefit from) the local decisions about
land-use to those who pay for the flood disaster—principally the federal
taxpayers.347

As an antidote to this problem, the Association suggests adoption of a “no
adverse impact” floodplain management standard under which “the actions of
one property owner are not allowed to adversely affect the rights of other property
owners.”348
If one takes seriously the Association’s warning that the actions of one landowner can cause physical harm to others’ property (and perhaps even endanger
lives), then local governments should enact floodplain regulations that go well
beyond the floor of the NFIP. In this context, the admonitions of Armstrong v.
United States—which undergird the takings doctrine—ring hollow.349 That is,
the suggestion that flood safety is a “public burden[] which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole” inverts the original scheme of the
NFIP, which calls for local governments and floodplain occupants to assume the
costs of and responsibility for risky development, primarily through the enactment of floodplain regulations.350
Litigation strategy: In litigation under Penn Central (which should be most
cases), government defendants should pay particular attention to the “character of
the government action” factor. In particular, they should link floodplain and
coastal regulations, where feasible, to the comprehensive, cooperative federalism
design of the NFIP, casting it as a “public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good” (in the language of Penn
Central351); as part of a program to “equitably spread the costs of flood disasters
among those landowners who most benefit from publicly funded flood disaster
relief” (in the words of Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Harris352); or as
“a reasonable land-use regulation, enacted as part of a coordinated federal, state,
and local effort to preserve [rivers, coasts], and surrounding land” (in the language of Murr v. Wisconsin353).
Educate landowners: Citizens might not be aware of the benefits to be gained
from federal flood insurance, as well as from local land-use regulation. Perhaps

347. Id.
348. Id.
349. See supra text accompanying note 227.
350. See supra Parts I.A–B.
351. See supra text accompanying note 268 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
352. See supra text accompanying note 278 (quoting Texas Landowners Rights Ass’n v. Harris, 453
F. Supp. 1025, 1031 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d, 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927
(1979)).
353. See supra text accompanying note 271 (quoting Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949–50
(2017)).
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the lessons from Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Harris (the early facial
challenge to the NFIP) can be appropriate, where landowners prodded their local
regulators to enact zoning ordinances making the community eligible for federal
flood insurance.354 Although some local regulators may be reluctant to enact
NFIP-compliant or stronger land-use regulations, some floodplain property owners are eager for their communities to participate in the program so that they can
purchase federal flood insurance. As the court recounted in 1978 in Texas
Landowners Rights, “[o]ne result of the Program . . . has been that property owners who find themselves saddled with . . . sanctions due to their communities’
non-participation in the Program have been lobbying and threatening legal action
against their local officials in an effort to compel flood insurance eligibility.”355
2. Physical Takings
A more comprehensive litigation strategy clarifying the distinction between
torts and takings could minimize the physical takings doctrine’s propensity to discourage Congress from funding federal flood control measures. Litigators could
emphasize how plaintiffs’ choice to frame their complaints in terms of takings
law could be an attempt to circumvent the tort immunity provisions Congress
carefully inserted into the Flood Control Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act.356
They could focus broadly on how Congress’ three approaches to flood control
(flood control structures, disaster relief, and federal insurance supported by local
land-use regulation)357 together make landowners far more secure from flooding
than if the government had taken no action (drawing on the language in Saint
Bernard Parish that plaintiffs’ causation analysis “must consider both riskincreasing and risk-decreasing government actions over a period of time to determine whether the totality of the government’s actions caused the injury”).358
They could also prevent the spending of limited federal dollars on piecemeal
compensation to flood victims with the resources to prosecute litigation against
the federal government, rather than on proactive, comprehensive measures to
enhance flood safety for all.
CONCLUSION
Over the past fifty years, the National Flood Insurance Program has drifted
from its original moorings and has evolved into an unwieldy and financially
unsustainable behemoth. We pour more and more money into the leaky bucket of
insurance payouts and premium subsidies, and yet we are no safer. The problem
354. See supra text accompanying notes 273–79.
355. Texas Landowners Rights, 453 F. Supp. at 1032 n.14.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 26–29.
357. See supra Part I.A.
358. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2018). See generally
supra text accompanying notes 299–303.
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is widespread, affecting rich and poor alike. But through the NFIP and other federal programs, Congress has sent the perverse signal that it is safe to live in floodplains, insured by the NFIP, tucked away behind federal dams and reservoirs, and
backstopped by federal disaster relief. Given these perverse incentives, it is no
wonder that people continue to move into known flood-danger areas but continue
to be taken by surprise when the floodwaters inevitably come.
Courts, for their part, have reinforced the hydrologic fantasy that laws and legal
doctrines can somehow make floodwaters go away or make people whole after
they are flooded. Under the judicially-created regulatory takings doctrine, landowners seek compensation when they are restricted from building in the floodplain. And under the physical takings doctrine, landowners who are permitted to
build in the floodplain seek compensation when the next flood comes. In effect,
the takings doctrine serves as a shadow insurance program that perpetuates the
perception that we can build in the floodplain without consequence.
Congress has been well-aware of the NFIP’s failings for years and has struggled to come up with a solution that is both politically feasible and financially
sustainable. But surprisingly, the national dialogue has ignored the other half of
the puzzle—the takings doctrine. There is no doubt that we need to find a way to
keep ourselves safe in our homes, without worry that we will be the next victim
of a hurricane along the coasts, or a flooding river inland. But any durable solution must look at the entire problem. It must harness the power of both Congress
and the courts to send the signal that floodplains are not safe and to create robust
incentives for people to stay out of harm’s way.

